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JUSTICE FOR ALL: REIMAGINING THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE
DavidJ. Herzig*
The ability of the Internal Revenue Service to both collect the tax and
enforce the initial determination of tax liability in a neutral and fair manner
has been compromised by a February 2011 pronouncement issued by the
Department of Justice stating that the President and the Department of Justice
believe that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional and
that the Department of Justice will no longer defend the statute in courts. The
pronouncement results in a disparate treatment of similar taxpayers based
solely on the forum of litigation. Through this lens, I examine whether it is
proper for the Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service to
continue to share prosecutorial powers when such results are possible.
Assuming that any incremental improvement is desirable as long as does not
harm one person, I conclude that the Department of Justice should have
exclusive litigation authority to protect against this very result.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To "[p]rovide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping them
understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with
integrity and fairness to all."'
1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE AGENCY, ITS MISSION AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last visited Jan.
16, 2013).
Justice For All
On the basis of a letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to
Representative Boehner (the DOJ Pronouncement), the Department of
Justice (DOJ) states that it no longer will defend section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) in court.2 The DOJ Pronouncement further states that
the President will continue to enforce the terms of DOMA.3 Executive
agencies, including the Service, are instructed to comply with section 3 of
DOMA unless and until Congress repeals it or the judiciary finally
determines its constitutionality. 4 Despite the stated desire of the President
and the DOJ to limit the pronouncement only to court cases, a ripple effect
now cascades as the exeutive agencies enforce DOMA through the
dministrative process.5
The DOJ Pronouncement requires the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) to treat similarly situated taxpayers differently. In a tax matter, after
2 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, to John A. Boehner, Speaker,
United States House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/February/i1 -ag-223.html [hereinafter DOJ Pronouncement] ("Given
that conclusion [that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is unconstutional], the President
has instructed the Department not to defend the statute in Windsor and Pedersen, now pending
in the Southern District of New York and the District of Connecticut. I concur in this
determination."). Currently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has followed up on its
pronouncement and in a brief filed in the immigration context in Defendants' Opposition to
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Lui v. Holder, No. 2:11 -CV-
01267-SVW (JCGx), 2011 WL 10653943 (C.D. Cal. 2011), available at
http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/Defendants%200pposition%20to%20MTD%2OLui%20v.
%20Holder.pdf [hereinafter DOJ Sept. 2 Brief] (stating that DOMA is unconstitutional even
in the immigration context); see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible
Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 508-09 (2012); Brianne J. Gorod, Defending
Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1201, 1207
(2012); Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More
Questions Than Answers, 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1875-76 (2012); Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but
Not Defending) 'Unconstitutional' Laws, 98 VA. L. REv. 1001, 1003-04 (2012); Douglas
Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the
Production ofSexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REv. 1169, 1217 (2012).
3 DOJ Pronouncement, supra note 2 ("Notwithstanding this determination, the
President has informed me that Section 3 will continue to be enforced by the Executive
Branch.").
4 Id. ("To that end, the President has instructed Executive agencies to continue to
comply with Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive's obligation to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial
branch renders a definitive verdict against the law's constitutionality.").
5 See, e.g., DOJ Sept. 2 Brief, supra note 2, at I (demonstrating the confusion of
executive agencies in that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, an
executive agency, is in theory required to comply with section 3 of DOMA but that DOJ will
not defend section 3 of DOMA in court proceedings).
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an administrative review process, the taxpayer may challenge the final
determination in court. The significance of the choice of forum in tax issues
is two-fold. First, there are three possible courts for this challenge: (1) Tax
Court, (2) Federal Court of Claims, and (3) district court. 6 Each court may,
at times, have exclusive jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction depending on
the underlying tax issue.7 Second, in Tax Court the Department of the
Treasury (Treasury), represented by the Chief Counsel of the Service,
represents the Commissioner in the litigation, while in district court, court of
claims, and appellate court, the DOJ represents the Commissioner.' The DOJ
Pronouncement thus creates two different litigation positions depending on
the resulting court: DOJ not defending DOMA and Chief Counsel defending
DOMA. 9
6 Thomas D. Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 62 TAX
LAW. 311, 311-12 (2009); David J. Herzig, Something From Nothing: Taxing Assets
Accurately, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1057, 1085 (2011); Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A
Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1195,
1196-97 (2008) [hereinafter Lederman Proposal]; Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman,
Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 557 n.299 (2011); Bryan T. Camp, The
Equal Protection Problem in Innocent Spouse Procedures, 112 TAX NOTES 281 (July 17,
2006) [hereinafter Camp, Equal Protection]. In sum, the Federal Court of Claims and the
district court have concurrent jurisdiction except for limited items such as: (1) the Court of
Federal Claims may not hear cases for the refund of either tax shelter promoter penalties or
understatement penalties under the Internal Revenue Code (Code) sections 6700 and 6701,
respectively, I.R.C. § 7422(i); (2) the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear cases brought solely to recover statutory interest in excess of $10,000, 28 U.S.C. §
149 1(a)(1); (3) the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to review an Internal Revenue
Service (Service) denial of interest abatement under section 6404(e)(1) of the Code, see Hinck
v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 503 (2007) (stating that Tax Court is the exclusive forum); and
(4) the Court of Federal Claims is without jurisdiction if the plaintiff has a claim pending for
the same matter in any other court, 28 U.S.C. § 1500.
7 Greenaway, supra note 6, at 313-15; Lederman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1196-97;
Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 281. For example, Tax Court and district court have
concurrent jurisdiction based on the taxpayer's decision for deficiency claims, while the Tax
Court has exclusive jurisdiction for section 6015 innocent spouse relief and district court has
exclusive jurisdiction for refund cases.
8 5 U.S.C. § 901; I.R.C. § 7452.
9 Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that a Service notice
"constituted a final agency action" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) [hereinafter APA], which ended what is referred as tax
exceptionalism); see also Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C.
211, 220, 225-26 (2010), rev'd 650 F.3d. 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia,
or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531
(1994) (discussing the tax exceptionalism view); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead:
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1537, 1541 (2006)
(noting that the "perception of tax exceptionalism ... intrudes upon much contemporary tax
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If the Service complies with the DOJ Pronouncement and enforces
section 3 of DOMA, equal protection and due process issues arise. First, there
will be a different standard applied during the administrative process, e.g.,
audit, than during the litigation process. Second, depending on the court in
which the matter is heard, the government will take different litigation
positions.' 0 The first issue results in claims that are examined under rational
basis scrutiny, while the second issue is an access-to-courts situation that
reads on a fundamental right and is examined under the strict scrutiny
standard. Finally, if the Commissioner complies with the DOJ
Pronouncement, he or she will violate the oath duty by enforcing a statute
believed to be unconstitutional.
Additionally, the different treatment of similarly situated taxpayers is a
failure of the purpose of the most recent Congressional reform effort of the
agency in 1998.1 The type of disparate treatment of taxpayers in the same
court that has been shunned since the Golsen v. Commissioner decision in the
1970s has cropped up again.12 As tax exceptionalism has slowly come to an
end,13 a broader examination should be taking place to determine if the 1998
scholarship and jurisprudence.").
10 Since a vast majority of the litigation is in Tax Court, this exacerbates the situation.
Approximately ninety-five percent of all federal tax cases are litigated in the Tax Court. See,
e.g., Lederman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1197; Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Conflating
Standards of Review in the Tax Court: A Lesson in Ambiguity, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1337, 1340
(2008).
1 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reformation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, §§ 1001-9016, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Reform Act]; see also
Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 105th Cong. 100 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Senate Hearing]; IRS Oversight: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 7 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Senate Hearing];
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TAXES 18 (2004); Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. I, 20-26
(2004) [hereinafter Camp, Administration]; John R. Gardner & Benjamin R. Norman, Effects
of the Shift in the Burden of Proof in the Disposition of Tax Cases, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1357-61 (2003); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the
U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 280 (2002); Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less:
Justifying and Reforming Tax Law's Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1071, 1105-06 (2012).
12 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that the Tax
Court will follow its own precedent or set its own rule of decision unless the court of appeal
to which an appeal would lie has already ruled on the issue; in such a case, the Tax Court will
follow the precedent of the relevant court of appeal).
13 Tax exceptionalism is the principle that tax law is different than other areas of
administrative law and that Treasury Department (Treasury) regulations should not be
afforded Chevron deference. See Kristin E. Hickman, Agency Specific Precedents: Rational
2013] 5
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Reform Act accomplished the stated goals. If not, as this article argues, then
Congress should revisit the 1998 reforms to institute the proper taxpayer
protections.
In Part II, I argue that the disparate treatment of taxpayers under the
current agency construct between the Service and the DOJ results in
colorable equal protection claims. At a minimum, it is clear that there is a
significant issue with the lack of intra-district enforcement of the same law
depending on the prosecutorial authority, i.e., the Service or the DOJ. The
splitting of the law creates an unnecessary friction, and this friction causes
gaming by taxpayers.14 The potential for forum shopping by taxpayers is
inefficient in both enforcement and compliance under our current system.
Thus, even if the equal protection argument fails, the friction must result in a
broader examination of the sharing of prosecutorial powers by the DOJ and
the Service.
In Part III, I examine the history of the Service to demonstrate that its
current incarnation is not the historical norm and has been significantly
modified. Once it is understood that the agency is not static, structural
changes to it may be examined in terms of whether they move the agency
closer to or further from its proper function regarding the promotion of the
efficient and fair collection of taxes. The Service, an agency that employs
both inquisitorial and adversarial techniques, creates confusion and
suboptimal reporting by taxpayers. Although other agencies utilize similar
techniques, the Service is special in that all citizens and residents of the
United States are subject to its jurisdiction. There are no opt-in or difficult
opt-out provisions.15 Thus, extra protections must be afforded for taxpayers.
Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 89, 104 (2011); Hickman, supra note 9,
at 1548; Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX REV. 205, 249-52 (2012);
Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over "Fighting Regs" and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation,
92 B.U. L. REv. 643, 700 (2012); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax
and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 968 (2004).
14 For example, although a taxpayer is married, for state law purposes, the related party
rules do not apply because of DOMA. See Voss v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 204 (2012)
(recognizing that taxpayers, although married, claimed a higher mortgage interest deduction
because of the application of DOMA); Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of
Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1529, 1536-39 (2008); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Saving
Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of Family Taxation, 86 IND. L.J. 1459, 1469,
1471 (2011).
15 I.R.C. § 877; H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 62-63 (2013) (listing the objective
requirements to be subject to the expatriation tax); I.R.S. Notice 09-85, 2009-45 I.R.B. 598;
Richard A. Westin, Expatriation and Return: An Examination of Tax-Driven Expatriation by
United States Citizens, and Reform Proposals, 20 VA. TAX REv. 75, 80-81 (2000); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy
for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1289 (2011).
Justice For All
From the premise that any incremental improvement is Pareto
efficient, 16 l ultimately argue in Part IV that the Service should be reformed.
I argue that the optimal organizational structure is for the DOJ to have full
litigation authority.
II. DOJ PRONOUNCEMENT
After decades of litigation, two different district courts in
Massachusetts,1 7 applying a rational basis standard, struck down section 3 of
DOMAl 8 as unconstitutional.1 9 Shortly following the Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management and Massachusetts v. U.S. Department ofHealth and
Human Services decisions, Attorney General Holder issued a pronouncement
stating that the DOJ would no longer defend DOMA cases. 20 The DOJ
Pronouncement went further than the Gill court, creating a new suspect
classification based on an individual's sexual identity, and found that section
3 of DOMA violated the equal protection clause under a strict scrutiny
approach.2' Subsequent to the DOJ Pronouncement, a number of cases have
been decided, almost all of which held that DOMA was unconstitutional
under the DOJ's articulated standard.22 Two of the DOMA series of cases are
under consideration with the Court.23
The DOJ Pronouncement provided that DOJ would not defend section 3
16 Eric A. Posner & David Weisbach, Internal Paretianism: A Defense, 13 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 347, 349 (2013) ("The Pareto principle in economics is an ethical standard that provides
that a project is socially desirable if it makes at least one person better off than in the status
quo and makes no person worse off.").
17 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff'd, 682 F.3d I
(1stCir. 2012); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234
(D. Mass. 2010), aff'd, 682 F.3d I (Ist Cir. 2012).
18 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (quoting DOMA as stating "the word 'marriage' means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.").
19 Id. at 387 ("[T]his court is convinced that 'there exists no fairly conceivable set of
facts that could ground a rational relationship' between DOMA and a legitimate government
objective.").
20 DOJ Pronouncement, supra note 2; DOJ Sept. 2 Brief, supra note 2 (stating that
DOMA is unconstitutional even in the immigration context).
21 DOJ Pronouncement, supra note 2; DOJ Sept. 2 Brief, supra note 2, at 10-23.
22 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 786 (2012); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 113 S. Ct. 786 (2012); Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 1. But see Sevcik
v. Sandoval, No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169643 (D. Nev. Nov. 26,
2012).
23 Hollingsworth, 113 S. Ct. at 786; Windsor, 113 S. Ct. at 786.
2013] 7
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of DOMA.24 This position, although not without controversy, appears to be
within the authority of the agency. 25 Since President Barack Obama believes
that DOMA is unconstitutional, he should neither enforce nor defend it.26
Thus, the current prevailing constitutional theory opines that the DOJ
Pronouncement is within the authority of the DOJ as an executive agency.27
The practical result of the DOJ Pronouncement in tax enforcement is the
creation of two litigation positions depending on the forum. In Tax Court, the
Service is compelled to take the position that section 3 of DOMA is
constitutional and enforce the provision.28 In district court or the Federal
Court of Claims, however, the DOJ will not defend the statute. 29 The result
of these disparate positions is that similarly situated taxpayers will be treated
differently - a traditional equal protection argument.
A. Equal Protection and Access to Courts
The Equal Protection Clause compels some limited standards of equal
24 DOJ Pronouncement, supra note 2.
25 Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 514-15 ("The President's critics and defenders
are both mistaken. Contrary to his critics, there simply is no duty to defend federal statutes the
President believes are unconstitutional. Contrary to his defenders, there likewise is no duty to
enforce such laws."); Gorod, supra note 2; Huq, supra note 2; Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive
Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DuKE L.J. 1183 (2012); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
The Executive's Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1664-66
(2008). There are older arguments that support contrary interpretations. See Christopher N.
May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Revisiting the Royal Prerogative, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 867, 881 (1994).
26 President Barack Obama is not the first president to make such a pronouncement.
President Thomas Jefferson was the first president to confront a law he believed
unconstitutional and utterly rejected any notion that he had to enforce and defend it. The
Sedition Act, passed during the presidency of John Adams, criminalized criticism of high-
ranking federal officers. Jefferson believed it was beyond the powers of Congress and violated
the First Amendment. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801),
in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 57 n. 1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (describing
Jefferson's decision to stop the prosecution of crimes under the Alien and Sedition Act); Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to William Duane (May 23, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra, at 54, 55 (indicating intention to "order a nolle prosequi" in such
cases); Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 514-15; Prakash, supra note 25, at 1664-66.
27 See generally Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 509; Gorod, supra note 2, at 1203;
Huq, supra note 2; Meltzer, supra note 25, at 1213-15.
28 See, e.g., Merrill v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 25 (2009).
29 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 786, 786 (2012); Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2012); Gill v. Office ofPers. Mgmt.,
699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010).
8 [Vol. 33:1
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treatment toward litigants.30 Most importantly, it requires that the
government, including the courts, treat all similarly situated persons
similarly.31 Laws that classify individuals based on race, ethnicity, national
origin, alienage, and religion must be justified by a compelling state
interest,32 and laws that classify individuals based on gender are subject to
intermediate scrutiny.33 Decisions based on other classifications, such as
age or wealth, are presumed to be valid and subject only to rational basis
review, absent some sub-constitutional protection. 34
Equal access to the courts has been deemed to be a fundamental right
subject to the strict scrutiny standard. 35 If the right is neither a fundamental
right nor a suspect classification, then the standard is examined using the
rational basis test. 36 I will first argue that much like the habeas cases, this is
a fundamental access to courts issue deserving strict scrutiny.37 Alternatively,
30 Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for "Trial by Formula", 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 604
(2012).
31 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985) (citing Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)); Lahav, supra note 30, at 604.
32 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A.
Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1407 n.141
(2010) ("Religion has been included in the list of suspect classifications, albeit in dicta."
(citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam))); Lahav, supra
note 30, at 604-05.
33 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 ("A gender classification fails unless it is substantially
related to a sufficiently important governmental interest." (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976))).
34 Id. at 440 ("The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)); United States R.R. Ret. Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Dukes, 427
U.S. 297); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
on the basis of age in programs receiving federal aid).
3 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 144 n.4
(1938); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); Calvin Massey, Two Zones ofProphylaxis:
The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 20
(2007) (stating that "access to courts receives strict scrutiny . . . ."); Alexander Tsesis, Self-
Government and the Declaration ofIndependence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 723 (2012).
36 U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483 (1955); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
37 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2003) (collecting cases in which right of
access to courts was held to be fundamental and strict scrutiny applied); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (recognizing the right of access to courts as "fundamental"); Mario L.
Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine, 43 CONN. L.
REv. 1059 (2011); Laura Gaston Dooley, Equal Protection and the Procedural Bar Doctrine
2013] 9
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even if this differing prosecutorial standard does not present an access-to-
courts, strict scrutiny equal protection issue because there is no denial of any
access to courts, then it is still a violation of equal protection under a rational
basis test.38
Tax issues are unique. 39 After the administrative review process, the
taxpayer may challenge the final determination. 40 The uniqueness of tax
issues is two-fold. First, there are three possible courts for this challenge: (1)
Tax Court, (2) Court of Claims, and (3) district court.4 1 Each court may, at
times, have exclusive jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction depending on the
underlying tax issue.42 For example, Tax Court and district court have
concurrent jurisdiction based on the taxpayer's decision for deficiency
claims. 43 While Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction for section 6015
innocent spouse relief, district court has exclusive jurisdiction for refund
cases. 44 Second, in Tax Court, the office of the Chief Counsel of the Service
represents the Commissioner in the litigation; in district court, the Court of
Claims, and appellate court, the DOJ represents the Commissioner.45
Under the DOJ Pronouncement, the Service is instructed to continue to
in Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 737, 755 (1991); Stephen I. Valdeck, Federal
Courts, Practice & Procedure: Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Power, 84 N.D. L. REv. 2107, 2117-18 (2009) (describing Griffin as the
beginning of a line of cases regrounding access to the courts in the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses following the early development of the "denial-of-access" case law
exemplified by exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546,547-49 (1941)).
38 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) ("The constitutional safeguard [of
the Equal Protection Clause] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside ifany state offacts reasonably
may be conceived tojustify it.") (emphasis added); Frank Easterbrook, Levels of Generality in
Constitutional Interpretation: Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 349 (1992).
39 See discussion supra note 9. Although other agencies have similar issues, tax adds
layers of complexity in the perceived taking by the government as well as the opt-in by all
U.S. citizens and residents.
40 See infra Part IV.
41 Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 281; Greenaway, supra note 6, at 311-12;
Lederman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1196-97.
42 Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 281; Greenaway, supra note 6, at 311-12;
Lederman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1196-97.
43 Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 281; Greenaway, supra note 6, at 311-12;
Lederman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1196-97.
4 Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 284; Greenaway, supra note 6, at 311-12;
Lederman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1196-97.
45 Greenaway, supra note 6, at 324; Lederman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1204.
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enforce the terms of section 3 of DOMA.46 Since the DOJ Pronouncement
does not instruct the administrative agency not to defend section 3 of DOMA,
the Chief Counsel would be required to advocate an unconstitutional position
in Tax Court. Thus, the application of the DOJ Pronouncement to Tax Court
proceedings violates equal protection principals. If access to a consistent
prosecutorial position turns on merely the difference in forum, then taxpayers
in courts that define the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA differently
are denied equal access to federal collateral review. 47 The procedural appeal
of the agency determination treats similarly situated taxpayers differently
even though their claims are identical.48 That different treatment violates the
equal protection principles the Court articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes.49
The Court has a rich history of ensuring that similarly situated
individuals are treated the same. 50 Further, there is a new movement pushing
for the natural extension of this doctrine to outcome equality.51 The
underlying principle is that once there is an avenue for challenging an
outcome, the government cannot cut back on that opportunity in a
discriminatory manner. 52
A hypothetical clarifies the problem. Suppose taxpayer A is a validly
married same-sex partner and has, through audit, been assessed a deficiency
because she claimed the marital deduction on the federal tax return. This
deduction was denied because the DOJ Pronouncement instructs the Service
to continue to enforce section 3 of DOMA, under which the marriage of
taxpayer A is not recognized. Assume that taxpayer A does not have the
requisite funds to go to district court and is forced to go to Tax Court, as is
the case with the majority of taxpayers. 53 In Tax Court, the Chief Counsel
46 DOJ Pronouncement, supra note 2.
47 But see Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 288.
48 Dooley, supra note 37, at 754.
49 433 U.S. 72, 87. 90-91 (1977); see also Dooley, supra note 37, at 754.
5o See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2003).
s See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and
Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1 (2011); Lahav, supra note 30.
52 Dooley, supra note 37, at 755; see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828-29
(1977) (stating that prison authorities must provide adequate law libraries and assistance to
prisoners who wish to pursue court claims to preserve their fundamental constitutional right
of access to the courts); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971) (holding that a
defendant convicted on misdemeanor charges is entitled to a transcript on appeal); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that the state's refusal to provide indigent
appellants with counsel in appeals as of right violates equal protection); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961) (holding that the nominal filing fee required of habeas corpus
petitioners violates equal protection).
5 See, e.g., Lederman Proposal, supra note 6; Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 10.
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represents the Service and continues to defend DOMA in the trial.54 Only
upon a circuit court appeal will the DOJ take over the government's
litigation.5 5 It should be noted, however, that an appeal is not compulsory and
might not even be likely. If one factors in the litigation costs, the prepayment
of tax due for appeal, and the litigation risk that either the DOJ or another
party will contest the appeal, or the court ignores the taxpayer and the DOJ
positions and rules the taxpayer may never be subjected to the standard that
the DOJ espoused in the memorandum.
On the other hand, we have taxpayer B, also a validly married same-sex
partner who, through audit, has been assessed the same deficiency for the
same reasons. Taxpayer B, however, has the requisite funds to go to district
court, and the DOJ immediately files a brief conceding that section 3 of
DOMA is unconstitutional and thus the deduction was valid.56 The federal
court system is treating taxpayers A and B differently even though their
federal constitutional claims are identical. This different treatment violates
equal protection principles.
Because disparate results occur based solely on the prosecutorial
standard, this is a question regarding fundamental access to courts and should
therefore be stricken under the strict scrutiny approach. That result is a
natural extension of both the habeas cases decided in the 1990s and those
54 Further, in Tax Court, the Service benefits from an asymmetry in expertise and
familiarity with the court. Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their
Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2006). The problem is exacerbated by the fact that most
taxpayers represent themselves in Tax Court. Over fifty percent of taxpayers appear before the
Tax Court without counsel and ninety percent of small tax cases are filed by pro se litigants.
See Michael J. Bommarito II et al., An Empirical Survey of the Population of U.S. Tax Court
Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX REV. 523, 529 (2011). In fact, ninety percent of tax cases are
heard in Tax Court. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., IRS DATA BOOK 2010, at tbl. 27 (2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soillOdatabk.pdf; Stephanie Hunter McMahon, An
Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse Relief Do Courts Implement Congress's Legislative
Intent?, 12 FLA. TAX REv. 629, 649 (2012).
" See I.R.C. § 7452; Lederman, supra note 13, at 671; Lederman Proposal, supra note
6, at 1204; Shirley D. Peterson, The Development of Tax Policy Through Litigation, 38 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 334, 334 (1991); David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX. L. REv. 331,
336 (2006).
56 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 786 (2012); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d 944, 946 (N.D. Cal.
2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010), aff'd, 682 F.3d I (1st
Cir. 2012); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 569-72 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); Heather Elliot,
Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III
Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 569 (2012).
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under consideration in the current crop of cases involving outcome litigation
principles. 57 Additionally, the Court has consistently held that "[c]hoices
about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among
associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our
society,' rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."M The
executive branch believes that DOMA is infringing on the fundamental right
to marry and the application thereof by the Service results in disparate
treatment.59 Nonetheless, in the event that the Court espouses that this is not
a fundamental right because there is access to judicial review, the standard
would still be subject to rational basis review, which it also fails. 60
B. Rational Basis Scrutiny and Diferent Methodologies
The rational basis test is rather fluid and is applied more loosely or
strictly depending on the classification and purposes. 61 The most flexible
version of the test determines if there is a government interest at stake, even
if the parties did not articulate the basis but the court concluded that a valid
basis exists, and if that interest has any theoretical connection to the
classification at issue.62 A more restrictive version of the test requires that
the interest be determined from the legislative history and a closer nexus exist
between the interest and the classification.63 A final version of the test states
57 For habeas cases, see generally Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827; Stephen B. Bright, Is
Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the
Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997);
Dooley, supra note 37, at 761-62. For outcome litigation, see generally William N. Eskridge,
Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183 (2000);
Lahav, supra note 30; Justin Reinheimer, What Lawrence Should Have Said: Reconstructing
an Equality Approach, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 505, 530 (2008).
58 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 (1996); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, The
Constitutional Right ofPoor People to Appeal Without Payment ofFees: Convergence ofDue
Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441 (1999).
5 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
60 See, e.g., Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 288.
61 See United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980) ("[T]he most
arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all . . . cases applied a uniform or consistent
[rational basis] test under equal protection principles.").
62 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) ("The constitutional safeguard [of
the Equal Protection Clause] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.").
63 Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Minnesota, 612 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1980), affd
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that, "[n]ot only must 'a classification . . .' be reasonable, . . . it must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike." 64
It has been argued that a meaningful review of the tax audit process
should be subject to the last standard mentioned above.65 There is a long and
robust history of agency decisions, especially those involving liability
assessments, being reviewed under the strictest version of the rational basis
standard.66
Let us investigate deeper into the history of taxpayers A and B. Upon the
filing of the tax return, the Service makes a decision to accept or not
accept the liability reported on the taxpayer's return. Once the Service
assesses the amount of tax due, it then makes certain decisions about how to
collect any outstanding balance. 67 The assessment serves two functions:
(1) to determine the liability, and (2) as the predicate to collect the tax. 68 This
entire process is an administrative review by the agency, in this case, the
Service. Both taxpayers A and B filed a joint return and reported all income
and deductions accurately. Through the administrative process, however, the
agents in charge of the review apply section 3 of DOMA, as the Service
maintains DOMA is constitutional.69
We must now determine the rationality of having one rule for the
administrative process and one rule for the litigation process. There does not
seem to be a rational relation to a legitimate government purpose. The
purpose of an administrative review of the assessment and collection of tax
by the Service is to ensure a correct reporting position.70 In fact, the
without opinion, 448 U.S. 901 (1980) (striking down state funding statutes whose legislative
history appeared to indicate the legislative purpose was to exclude Planned Parenthood from
funding available to hospitals and whose litigation rationales were insufficiently connected to
the disparate treatment of Planned Parenthood and hospitals).
64 Planned Parenthood, 612 F.2d at 363.
65 Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 288-90.
66 Not only has the Court held that access to the courts is a fundamental right, Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2003), it has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental nature
of the right to judicial review in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (reviewing history of judicial review of agency
actions); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that imposition of filing fees
on indigent plaintiffs was denial of due process); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)
(reading the APA, supra note 9, as creating a strong presumption of judicial review).
67 Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 282.
68 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935).
69 DOJ Pronouncement, supra note 2.
70 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).
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taxpayer's burden in Tax Court is to argue against the correctness of the
determination. 71 Yet, through this process the Service is espousing an
incorrect reporting position in light of the litigation position of the DOJ and
the President.
The best rationale is that since the DOJ Pronouncement was not issued
through notice and comment rule, it is not binding on other agencies. 72 i
addition, there is a fluidity of the position itself because the official opinion
of the DOJ may change upon the election of a new President. 73 Given the
longer horizon of consistency in the interpretation of the Code, the Service
may not want to respond to the DOJ. Historically, the Service has not wanted
to take differing positions during an audit and makes certain concessions in
order to avoid a situation when those positions may change upon litigation.
The Service always reserves the right to change litigation positions. 74
Since the agency itself is not bound by earlier decisions, potentially
inconsistent treatment by following the DOJ does not seem rationally related
to any stated government purpose; in fact, it is directly at odds with the stated
government purpose. The position requires audits and challenges that result
in direct expenses by the Service to refute a position that will eventually be
conceded in litigation.
71 I.R.C. § 7491; see also supra note 2.
72 The DOJ must make some rules through the notice-and-comment rulemaking
function. For example, in the area of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, the DOJ should issue
positions through notice and comment. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Department of Justice Anti-Bribery Provisions Notice, 55
Fed. Reg. 28,694, 28,694 (July 12, 1990); Gideon Mark, Private FPCA Enforcement, 49 AM.
Bus. L.J. 419, 452 (2012). Executive agencies, however, are not bound by the notice-and-
comment requirements for litigation positions. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 914, 961 (2012). The failure to engage in such process would undermine
basic administrative law principals that render the decision binding only on that agency.
7 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse
Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment
Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 87 (2010) (Obama
Administration's DOJ reversed its longstanding position that reverse payments do not warrant
antitrust scrutiny); Dawn Johnsen, "The Essence of a Free Society:" The Executive Powers
Legacy of Justice Stevens and the Future of Foreign Affairs Deference, 106 Nw. U. L. REV.
467, 519 (2012) (change in position in the pending Guantdnamo habeas litigation).
74 See generally Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970); Bryan T. Camp, The
Failure ofAdversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J. 57 (2009) [hereinafter
Camp, Failure]; Amy E. Sloan, The Dog that Didn't Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion





In addition to the equal protection issues, the oath that the Commissioner
of the Service takes presents a constitutional issue.7 5 If the President's
constitutional theory is true, then the Commissioner, like the President,
should not enforce unconstitutional laws. 76
Under title 5, section 3331 of the United States Code, the Commissioner
takes the following oath:
I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.
Unlike the President, the Commissioner does not have a duty to execute
the laws faithfully.77 The sole duty of the Commissioner is to defend the
Constitution. First, it is accepted that the President's article II oath duty
prevails over the article II execution duty and the President must not defend
legislation he believes to be unconstitutional.78 Second, the President, the
DOJ, and multiple courts believe that section 3 of DOMA is
unconstitutional. 79 Thus, because of the Commissioner's oath duty and his
status as a principal officer of the United States, the Commissioner must
refuse to defend section 3 of DOMA.
III. HISTORY OF THE SERVICE
Under the current construct in which the Service and the DOJ split
prosecutorial power, I argue that the disparate treatment of taxpayers results
in colorable equal protection claims. Regardless of the ultimate conclusion
of that premise, the discussion therein highlights the significant issue with
the lack of intra-district enforcement of the same law depending on the
prosecutorial authority, e.g., the Service or the DOJ. Thus, a review of the
underlying construct, the sharing of prosecutorial powers, should take place.
The Service has both lawmaking and enforcement powers. Although the
71 See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
76 See supra Part II.
n See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; supra notes 19-20.
78 See supra Part II.
7 DOJ Pronouncement, supra note 2.
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Service lies within the executive branch, the legislative branch has great
influence over it as well. "Given the fine line between lawmaking and law
enforcement, it is always difficult to say when one shades into the other, but
clearly there is an inevitable tension between congressional oversight powers
and the executive exercise of delegated powers to interpret, articulate, and
execute the tax laws."80
This tension between the executive branch and the legislature has been
demonstrated over time by the fluctuation of primary influence over the
Service: the sphere of influence of the executive branch dominated during
the 1960s through the late 1970s, while that of the legislature dominated
during the early 1980s. ' In order to address the issue of whether or not the
Service should have prosecutorial discretion, a review of the history,
especially the tug of war over control of the agency, is necessary.
A. The Early Tax and Collection
Congress enacted the first income tax as part of the Revenue Act of
1861.82 Most lawmakers believed that the law was provisional as a result of
the Civil War.83 Since this was the first time there was a national tax, no
collection agency yet existed; until this time, taxes were levied and collected
at the state level. The Treasury, under Secretary Salmon P. Chase, and the
public at large believed that creating a national bureaucracy was inefficient
and expensive. 84 In fact, it is widely believed that Secretary Chase prevented
the collection of the tax, requiring further action by Congress. 85
In 1862, Congress enacted a comprehensive income tax and a collection
methodology. 86 The Revenue Act of 1862 provided for the establishment the
80 Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS
Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1368 (1980).
8' For the executive influence over the Service, see infra notes 116-148; for the
legislative influence over the Service, see infra notes 149-165.
82 Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292 (1861). There were other taxes such
as excise and property before the Civil War, but the Revenue Act of 1861 imposed the first
direct tax on income.
83 John Thomdike, Reforming The Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 721 (2001).
84 Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. EcoN. 416, 418 (1894); Thorndike,
supra note 83, at 721; The Tax Bill - The Cost of Collecting the Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1862, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 862/07/08/news/the-tax-bill-the-cost-of-
collecting-the-taxes.html.
85 SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 391 (1967).
86 Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (1862); Thomdike, supra note 83, at 722;
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRS (Jan. 2, 2013),
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Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the Treasury 87 and
allowed the President to divide the country into collection districts.88
President Abraham Lincoln divided the country into 185 districts, and
George S. Boutwell took office as the first Commissioner.
Congress allowed this first income tax to expire in 1872, and it was not
until The Tariff Act of 1894 that the tax was reintroduced.8 9 The Tariff Act
was short lived, as the Court found it unconstitutional one year later in
Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. 90
During this time period, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the
precursor to the Service, was formed and, despite the demise of the income
tax in 1895, the fundamental structure would endure. 91 Powers regarding
"[r]egulatory and interpretive issues were reserved for the commissioner's
office" 92 and the tension between the executive and legislative branches
regarding control over the office remained.93 During these early years,
Congress took the dominant role in shaping the BIR.94 The executive branch
was passive, which was amplified as a result of weak Presidents, including
Andrew Johnson. 95
Then, in 1913 Congress passed the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, and the Tariff Act of 1913, the first modem income tax, was
passed soon thereafter. 96 The next major review and reform of the BIR
happened after World War I, and much like the reform efforts after the Civil
War, few changes occurred. 97 The key concept of these reform efforts was
that Congress took the lead and review happened despite President Warren
Harding's Administrations' attempts to stop it.98 Since the World War I
revenue legislation increased revenues from an average of $281 million to
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Brief-History-of-IRS.
87 Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (1862); see also Bryan T. Camp, Theory
and Practice in Tax Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 229 (2009) [hereinafter Camp,
Theory]; Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the Components ofIncome: A U.S. Perspective, 86 GEO.
L.J. 123 (1997); Thomdike, supra note 83, at 723.
88 Camp, Theory, supra note 87, at 229; Thomdike, supra note 83, at 723.
89 See Revenue Act, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894).
90 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
91 Thomdike, supra note 83, at 723.
92 Id. at 724.
9 Id. at 728.
94 This includes both during its creation and the postwar reform in the 1860s. See id at
733-35.
95 Id. at 735.
96 See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § Il(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913).




$2.78 billion per year, the BIR was required to expand dramatically.99 This
burden left the BIR in dire straits.100
By 1922, after numerous accusations of patronage, mismanagement,
delayed processing, and corruption, the Treasury announced its intention to
organize the bureau.101 Assistant Secretary Elmer Dover's restructuring plan
also included the politicalizing of the bureau by proposing to replace the
Woodrow Wilson Administration holdovers with new administration
appointees.102 Although Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon backed down
from this type of political action, the Republican leaders in Congress took up
a review of the agency.
The resulting reform was led by Congress and was not preventable by
the Executive. In fact, Secretary Mellon was dragged through the mud by
influential progressive Republican Senator James Couzens without the
administration being able to stop the attacks. 103 Essentially, Couzens created
a laundry list of items that Congress disliked about the BIR.104 The most
important item Congress adapted from the Couzens Committee report was
the establishment of the Joint Committee on Internal Taxation that, with the
Treasury, shaped tax policy. 0 5
In 1952, Congress was again actively exploring the BIR, in light of
allegations of corruption, and President Harry Truman's Administration
initially took an unsurprising passive approach.106 Eager to gain political
favor with the public, however, the executive branch began assembling plans
for a "major overhaul of the BIR."'0o "The 1952 reorganization dramatically
remade the BIR . ... " For the first time since 1862, a new structure was
implemented that abolished politically appointed positions beneath the
Commissioner and created an entirely new organizational structure.109 By
99 Id. at 743.
100 T.S. Adams stated that "[n]o federal administration, in my opinion, is capable during
the next five or six years of carrying with even moderate success two such burdens as the
income tax and the excess profits tax." Id at 746; see also Roy G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C.
BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 52-57, 533 (1940).
101 Thorndike, supra note 83, at 747.
102 id.
103 See id. at 736.
104 id.
'os Id. at 752.
106 Thorndike, supra note 83, at 760.
107 Id.; see also SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS, 82D CONG.,
REPORT ON INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION 27 (Subcomm. Print 1952).




1954, the reform change had been completed, including changing the name
of the BIR to the Internal Revenue Service.1 0 The 1952 reform was unique
from previous attempts at reform because of the degree of executive branch
involvement; while Congress still took the lead the executive branch
developed the details.
"The reform efforts of the 1950s insulated the [Service] from excessive
Treasury meddling, reflecting concerns that the agency not be used for
political purposes."'1 Nevertheless, from the 1960s to today, there have been
numerous allegations that the agency has been used as such, from executive
branch interference in tax cases in the 1970s l 2 to the auditing of certain
charitable organizations. This can be clearly seen in one of the Articles of
Impeachment proposed by the Judiciary Committee, which alleged that
President Richard Nixon had "endeavored to obtain from the Internal
Revenue Service, in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens,
confidential information contained in income tax returns for purposes not
authorized by law. . . ." 13
Congress's response to the over-politicization of the Service was to enact
section 6103 of the Code, which had stringent restrictions over the use of
Service information. 114 Nonetheless, Congress did not address whether the
Treasury as an agent of the Executive would be prohibited from dictating
public policy through the agency.
In 1996, the final reform effort took place, leaving the agency as it stands
today. Once again responding to criticism that the Service was arbitrary,
inquisitive, and overly political in nature, Congress convened a Commission
to make recommendations. 115 The Congressional Commission's
recommendation took a different approach from the earlier efforts. 116 First,
110 Id. at 763.
I1 Id.at771.
112 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DISCLOSURE & PRIVACY
LAW REFERENCE GUIDE, PUBLICATION No.4639, at 1-7 [hereinafter DISCLOSURE & PRIVACY],
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4639.pdf ("The events leading to the revision of
the tax disclosure laws in 1976 can, however, be directly traced to Executive Orders 11697
and 11709, issued by President Richard Nixon authorizing the Department of Agriculture to
inspect the tax returns of all farmers 'for statistical purposes."'); see also Thomdike, supra
note 83, at 771.
"' H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 3 (Comm. Print 1974);
DISCLOSURE & PRIVACY, supra note 112, at 1-8.
114 See, e.g., T. Keith Fogg, Transparency in Private Collection of Federal Taxes, 10
FLA. TAX REV. 763, 770-72 (2011).
115 Thorndike, supra note 83, at 768-69.
116 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 11, at 18, 183; Thorndike, supra note 83, at 773.
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it focused on creating a "friendlier" Service. Second, it set out to
fundamentally reform the structure of the agency. 17 This included a proposal
to remove the Service from the Treasury to an independent agency.118
The White House did not endorse the Commission findings, including
the recommendation that a new Board of Directors appoint the Service
Commissioner.l 19 It was argued that the Congressional recommendations
were unconstitutional eviscerations of executive powers. 120 In response, the
White House released a governance plan that allowed the "Treasury
Department overall control of the agency."'21
B. Misuses of the Service
As can be seen through the history of the Service, the agency is
inherently political in nature. It answers to two masters: Congress and the
Executive. The ebb and flow of which branch is the ultimate master has
resulted in numerous allegations over time regarding the politicizing of the
Service. Essentially, the Service has been accused of using the audit process
for political purposes. 122 From the McCarthy 1950s to the 1990s there is
much lore of Service abuse, including Operation Leprechaun,123 Operation
117 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REP. ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, JCX-
38-02 at 34 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 SERV. REPORT] ("Goals of the IRS Reform Act included
increasing public confidence in the [Service] and making the [Service] an efficient, responsive,
and respected agency that acts appropriately in carrying out its functions."); Wm. Brian
Henning, Reforming the IRS: The Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 405, 405-06 (1999); Leandra Lederman, Tax
Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 977-80 (2003).
118 NAT'L COMM'N ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REP. OF THE
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 4 (1997),
available at http://www.house.gov/natcommirs/main.htm [hereinafter NAT'L RESTRUCTURING
COMM'N REPORT].
119 Thorndike, supra note 83, at 773.
120 Id. at 773-74.
121 Id. at 774; Ryan Donmoyer, Clinton Pitches Private-Sector Board of Trusteesfor the
IRS, 77 TAX NOTES 138, 138 (Oct. 13, 1997); Al Gore & Robert E. Rubin, White House Report
on IRS Reforms, 97 TNT 198-67 (Oct. 14, 1997).
122 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATION MATTERS 12-13 (Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter 2000 SERV. REPORT].
123 See JOHN A. ANDREW, III, POWER TO DESTROY: THE POLITICAL USES OF THE IRS FROM
KENNEDY TO NIXON 4-5,299-313 (2002); The IRS's $287 Billion Man, TIME, Apr. 7,1975, at
70, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,917244,00.html#ixzz
IKIFEOtE5 (reporting a Nixon-era scandal involving the alleged recruitment by Service tax
sleuths of a sex spy to collect information on prominent Floridians).
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Snowball,124 and the Nixon Enemies List.125 Investigations in both the
distant and near past have found many executive requests but have not found
any such misuse. 126 Congress too has also abused the Service, including
legislative prohibitions during the 1970s forbidding the Service from
providing nationwide guidance with respect to certain tax issues. 127
The Service has a longstanding policy of shielding political appointees
from involvement in almost all specific taxpayer matters.128 This policy is
supported by Congress's enactment of section 6103 of the Internal Revenue
Code (Code), which protects taxpayer confidentiality. Clearly, politics
should not be taken into account in deciding whom to audit or whether a
group merits additional scrutiny. The additional question that must be
addressed, however, is whether the Service should also be removed from
making political decisions regarding the application of tax laws that favor
taxpayers.
1. Executive Misuses
As discussed, from the Service's inception as the BIR through the late
1950s, the executive branch remained neutral or passive in its dominion over
the agency. That backseat driver position began to change in the late 1950s
when the Service was used to investigate individuals and groups associated
with the Communist Party of the United States.129 The Service was alleged
to be conducting a crusade that mirrored Senator Joseph McCarthy's
witch-hunt. In fact, one Ninth Circuit judge stated of an apparent targeted
investigation of taxpayers in the late 1950s:
I regard what I have recited above as a scandal of the first magnitude
in the administration of the tax laws of the United States. It discloses
nothing less than a witch-hunt, a crusade by the key agent of the
United States in this prosecution, to rid our society of unorthodox
124 ANDREW, supra note 123, at 141-42 (discussing Operation Snowball, an investigation
into more than thirty-one companies for attempting to make campaign contributions appear to
be deductible).
125 Id. at 201-24 (discussing President Nixon using Service records to target those on his
enemies list, resulting in section 6103 of the Code).
126 2000 SERV. REPORT, supra note 122, at 6-11.
127 Parnell, supra note 80, at 1369.
128 Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV.
625, 668-69 (2007).
129 See, e.g., Lenske v. United States, 383 F.2d 20, 27-28 (9th Cir. 1967) (Madden, J.,
writing separately) (stating that the Service targeted and investigated the defendant because of
his thoughts on Communist countries such as Cuba, Laos, and China).
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thinkers and actors by using federal income tax laws and federal
courts to put them in the penitentiary. No court should become an
accessory to such a project.130
The 1960s witnessed a further mobilization of the Service as a tool for
the President. President John F. Kennedy gratified his desire to root out
organized crime by employing Carmine Bellino to inspect Service files on
suspected criminal figures such as Jimmy Hoffa.131 In fact, when the
Treasury issued a memorandum stating that it could not get involved in
organized crime investigations, Attorney General Robert Kennedy ignored
it. 132 It is posited that the Kennedy administration specifically picked Service
Commissioner Mortimer Caplin because of his close relationship with the
family and his promise to collaborate in sharing intelligence with other
agencies. 133 Prior to this, the Service had limited itself to investigations of
cases where revenue was raised from fines and penalties.134
Other than the potential misuse of the Service in the processing of the
organized crime figures, the main other charge levied against the Kennedy
Administration was the attack on tax-exempt organizations. In late 1961, the
Service launched the Ideological Organizations Project.1 35 This was the
beginning of a four-decade use of the Service to investigate charitable
organizations with political leanings. In 1962, President Kennedy asked
Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillion to investigate charity balls.136 As part
of the inquiry, the Administration asked for a solution for the right wing
critics. The resulting "Reuther Memorandum" to Attorney General Robert
Kennedy outlined the "possible Administration policies and programs to
combat the radical right."1 37 The third recommendation of the Reuther
Memorandum was to "choke off the flow of money to the radical right by
challenging the groups' tax-exempt status."1 38
The inquiries into these organizations demonstrate how difficult it can
130 id.
131 ANDREW, supra note 123, at 11-12; ROBERT L. GOLDFARB, PERFECT VILLAINS,
IMPERFECT HEROES: ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S WAR AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME 48 (1995).
132 GOLDFARB, supra note 131, at 48.
133 Id.; see also ANDREW, supra note 123, at 12. But see Mitchell Rogovin, The Kennedy
Years at the Internal Revenue Service: Mortimer Caplin, Commissioner (1961-1964), 14 VA.
TAX REV. 425, 473 (1994) (ex-Commissioner Caplin claiming the Kennedy administration left
the Service alone).
134 GOLDFARB, supra note 131, at 48.
' Id. at 23.
136 ANDREW, supra note 123, at 17.
137 Id. at 20.
138 Id. at 21.
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be for the Service to be apolitical. On the one hand, in order to be a tax-
exempt organization, political activity must not be significant, although it is
permitted. 139 The Service, therefore, has an affirmative duty to ensure that all
tax-exempt organizations comply with the grant of authority. Yet on the other
hand, the Service is not supposed to target any tax-exempt organization based
on political rather than compliance objectives.
Where is the line? If a majority political party is in office, then clearly
alternative viewpoints espoused through a tax-exempt organization will rise
to the top of the concern list. Is that organization being investigated for
compliance or retaliation?1 40 During the Kennedy administration, the Service
admitted targeting, stating that "candidates for both the first and second phase
were drawn from information received from Members of Congress,
complaint letters from the public, publicity in the news media and
information. contained in the Service's file." 1 4 1 Nonetheless, Commissioner
Caplin denied that the Service was forced into acting based on pressure from
the Kennedy White House. 142 Although Caplin's remarks seem to run
counter to the record, 143 they demonstrate just how impossible it is for the
Service to remain neutral.
Other than these accusations, there were no other earth-shattering
Kennedy moments, aside from the historic patronage claims for the
appointments of Service officials. 144
139 Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law's Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 29
(2011); see also, e.g., in re Westboro Baptist Church, 189 P.3d 535, 554 (Kan. Ct. App.
2009) (noting that "our Supreme Court has determined that political action or activities are not
considered a religious activity" in affirming a denial of tax exemption for personal property
owned by a religious group, but used for political purposes); New Eng. Legal Found. v. City
of Boston, 670 N.E.2d 152, 158 n.8 (Mass. 1996) (asserting that state law precludes tax
exemption for organizations at some level of political activity); Mich. United Conservation
Clubs v. Twp. of Lansing, 378 N.W.2d 737, 743 n.6 (Mich. 1985) ("[C]ertain forms of
lobbying may preclude a tax exemption.").
140 See, e.g., ANDREW, supra note 123, at 46-57. The inquiry into Billy James Hargis and
the Christian Crusade shows that this is not really possible. Hargis started out as a clergy
member. In the 1950s he devoted his time to "fighting liberalism and communism." He linked
together religion, liberalism, and communism, creating a political/religious organization.
Thus, at the heart of his message was both religion and politics. How can they be separated?
The Service thought that it was political with a religious cover. Despite three "no change
letters" in earlier audits, in the fourth audit conducted within two years, finally in connection
with the Ideological Operations Project, there was evidence that the organization was political
in nature.
141 Id. at 23.
142 Id. at 24; Rogovin, supra note 133, at 473.
143 ANDREW, supra note 123, at 25-44.
14 See id. at 16, 181 (citing the example of the 1962 steel crisis and the tabling of key
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The use of the Service by the Executive was tempered by President
Lyndon Johnson. 145 By the termination of the Nixon administration, though,
the Service had been fully infiltrated by the Executive. In fact, there was a
Service employee described as an "undercover agent" responsible for
transmitting information and reporting to the White House on sensitive
matters. 146 It is no surprise today to learn that Nixon used the Service to
punish his enemies and reward his friends. 147 Unlike under the Kennedy or
Johnson administrations, we have extensive information of Nixon's doings
through the investigations held by the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force. 148
The Nixon Administration wanted to treat the Service the way the
second Bush administration treated the DOJ. First, the White House focused
on removing Democrats from the agency by naming political appointments
as assistant commissioners under the guise of reorganization. 149 Second, the
administration wanted to control the focus of the agency and its enforcement
decisions.
Upon taking office, Nixon immediately wanted to use the Service for
political purposes.150 The first opportunity Nixon took advantage of was
appointing Clark Mollenhoff to the same post to which Kennedy had
appointed Bellino: special counsel. Nixon's Commissioner, Randolph
Thrower, complied with White House requests to "inspect .. . tax return[s],
application[s] for exemption, or other Internal Revenue file[s] ... . It was
confirmed that all requests from Mollenhoff were directed by the White
House. 152 The interesting paradigm that existed at that time was that there
Kennedy administration officials as further Kennedy involvement, and the Truman tax
scandals where politically appointed Service officials accepted bribes to affect taxes).
145 Id. at 139 ("The relationship between the White House and the Internal Revenue
Service is much more difficult to uncover under Lyndon Johnson than during the Kennedy
years.").
146 Rogovin, supra note 133, at 473.
147 ANDREW, supra note 123, at 179.
148 See, e.g., Operation Leprechaun: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong. (1975); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH
CONG., INVESTIGATION INTO CERTAIN CHARGES OF THE USE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter SERV. INVESTIGATION].
149 ANDREW, supra note 123, at 188-89.
150 Id. at 180; see also Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-339, at 3 (1974); Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning In Charities: Using an
Intermediate Penalty to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 Pirr. TAX REv. 125, 153
(2011).




was no question that the White House had the right to examine any income
tax return. 153 Only the manner in which the returns were to be made available
was limited. 154
This led to the famous "Enemies List," a pattern of the White House
exerting pressure over the Service to audit opponents of the administration.15 5
Unlike the Kennedy administration's focus on tax-exempts, Nixon expanded
the scope of executive control to his political enemies. The Nixon
administration established the Special Service Staff to specifically
investigate "known militants and activists."1 56
After the full story of the abuses of the Service by the Nixon
administration was documented by the Watergate Commission, Congress
responded with the enactment of section 6103 of the Code. In the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Congress created a series of narrow exceptions to govern
disclosure of tax information rather than granting broad discretion to the
executive branch.' 5 7
By the beginning of the 1980s, the Service was transformed into its most
current incarnation. From its inception during the Civil War as the BIR to
now, the Service is an agency that tries to collect tax without prejudice. This
lofty ambition is full of dichotomy. For example, is the review of an exempt
organization based on ideological principles or because the organization has
both political and nonpolitical goals?15 8 Is inaction by the Service really an
action? Is the Service truly political in nature because at the end of the day it
is bound by a political organization in enforcement of their policies?
2. Congressional Misuses
The executive branch is not alone in exercising its political influence
over the Service. After the reform provisions in 1976, Congress took a more
active role in the enforcement goals of the Service. 159 Since the Service's
inception, Congress has conducted an annual review of the Service in order
153 Id. at 185
154 id
155 SERV. INVESTIGATION, supra note 148; ANDREW, supra note 123, at 201.
156 ANDREW, supra note 123, at 250.
157 Fogg, supra note 114, at 770-71; see generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 313-16 (Comm. Print
1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 263 [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION].
158 The recent targeting of the "Tea Party" charities provides a current illustration of this
question. See, e.g., Op-Ed., Release the Facts About the IRS Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/opinion/release-the-facts-about-the-
irs-scandal.html?_r=0.
15 Parnell, supra note 80, at 1360.
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to, among others things, ensure that there is no corruptionl 60 and examine
enforcement methods. 161
Much like executive involvement, Congressional involvement was
occasional, but since the 1976 reform, there has been an explosion of
Congressional hearings regarding the Service's administration of the law.162
For example, between the establishment of the oversight committees in
January 1975 through 1979, the Service Commissioner made over 134
appearances before various congressional committees. 163 This includes 104
involving Congressional oversight of tax administration. 164 Congressional
intervention is not limited to hearings. Congress has at times prohibited the
Service from executing certain aspects of the tax law.165
Intervention by Congress with the Service would seem to violate our
basic tenants of separation of powers. Under our system of government, the
high school civics approach is that a separation of powers doctrine is implied
from the Constitution.166 Legislative power is in the Congress, executive
power in the President, and judicial in the Courts. In other words, Congress
enacts the law, the President's duty is to enforce the law, and the judiciary
interprets the law. The interaction between the executive and the legislative
branch, however, is far more complicated.
The Service has law making powers that arise in a number of situations.
First, when the Service interprets the Code, it makes law. 167 The Service also
makes law institutionally - it issues nationwide guidance that comes in
160 Id. at 1360-61; see also, e.g., Louis Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 359, 360 (1947) ("[E]very statute is a delegation of lawmaking
power to the agency appointed to enforce it"); cf BORRIS 1. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 14.01, at 14-7 to 14-8
(4th ed. 1979) (noting that the Service can sometimes make "law" by "a lifted eyebrow;"
practitioners must study statutes, regulations, decisions, published rulings, and "the informal
administrative climate").
161 Pamell, supra note 80, at 1368-69; see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1675 (1975).
162 Pamell, supra note 80, at 1369.
163 Id.
165 Id. at 1370; see Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 2006(c), 88 Stat. 829 (1974). The action was extended by Congress in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1506, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), and the Tax Treatment
Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 5, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978). The issue of tax
treatment of salary reduction plans was finally resolved by Congress in the Revenue Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2785 (codified at I.R.C. § 401(k), 402(a)(18)).
166 Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 508-09; Gorod, supra note 2, at 1207; Parnell,
supra note 80, at 1362.
167 Pamell, supra note 80, at 1362.
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many forms: revenue rulings, private letter rulings, the Internal Revenue
Manual, and Chief Counsel memorandum.168 Finally, Congress has
expressly delegated legislative power to the Service to make regulations for
the enforcement of the Code.169
The Service does have limitations on its power to create law. First,
Congress has a number of checks on the Service. "Congress has the power to
investigate the [Service's] administration."1 70 Congress also has the power
to attack with its purse-strings.17 1 Finally, courts review the Service's
guidance.172
In response to the Nixon abuses, Congress has sometimes improperly
tried to influence the Service, starting in the late 1970s. For example, during
the Tax Reform Act of 1975, "Congress delayed Revenue Ruling 76-215 for
one year."' 73 This allowed affected taxpayers to have another year to
"renegotiate their contracts with foreign governments" and not be subject to
the new rules.174 Congress continued to use this newfound power to pick and
choose Service interpretations it preferred. For example, the "[Service] was
instructed to disregard Revenue Ruling 76-453 in determining the
deductibility of travel expenses."' 7 5 Further, the "[Service] was instructed ...
to follow [Service] rules in effect prior to that ruling, and to issue no rulings
or regulations prior to May 1978 with respect to the deductibility of travel
168 Id. at 1363-64. For example, the Service issues the Internal Revenue Manual that is a
compilation of instructions promulgated by the Service for the guidance of its employees in
administering the tax law. See Archie W. Parnell, Jr., The Internal Revenue Manual: Its Utility
and Legal Effect, 32 TAx LAW. 687, 687 (1979) ("[E]xplanation of structure and contents of
the Manual, and analysis of what legal effect courts should give [it].").
169 I.R.C. § 7805(a); see also Parnell, supra note 80, at 1364.
170 Pamell, supra note 80, at 1365.
171 H.R. CONF. REP. 105-760 (1998) (Congress refused to permit uses of funds without a
plan); Leslie Book, Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
85, 92 (2009); Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
Riders, 1987 DuKE L.J. 456, 491-92 (1987).
172 Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force ofLaw, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013); Steve
R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV.
269 (2012).
17 Parnell, supra note 80, at 1371; see Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1035(c)(3), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). The provision was expanded in order to treat calendar year
and fiscal year taxpayers equally in the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 701(u)(9),
92 Stat. 2916 (1978).
174 Parnell, supra note 80, at 1371; see also GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 157.
' Parnell, supra note 80, at 1372; see also Rev. Rul. 76453, 1976-2 C.B. 86 (providing
that expenses incurred in traveling between taxpayer's residence and place of work, even a
temporary work place, may not be deducted).
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expenses." 76 Most importantly, Congress limited the ability of the Service
to promulgate regulations in certain areas during the 1977 and 1978 Revenue
Acts.' 77
C. 1998 Revised Mission Statement
In 1995, Congress established a commission to consider restructuring
the Service.178 The purpose of Congressional intervention was to further
insulate the Service from pressures of both Congress and the Executive. The
commission made several recommendations focusing on oversight,
technology, and recovering damages.179 As a result of the commission's
report, legislation was introduced with the associated hearings.s 0 Although
the government subsequently investigated many of the horror stories and
found them to be unfounded or exaggerated,18 the legislation was passed.
In 1998, Congress passed the Restructuring and Reform Act (1998
Reform Act). 182 The Act established a taxpayer bill of rights that was
intended to safeguard the taxpayer rights and assist taxpayers in disputes. The
176 Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 2, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978)
[hereinafter 1977 Act]. Congress later extended these instructions until January 1980, Act of
Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 2, 92 Stat. 996 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Act], and then
continued them until June 1981, Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-167, § 2, 92 Stat. 1275
(1978) (uncodified). See also Parnell, supra note 80, at 1372.
17 1977 Act, supra note 176; Parnell, supra note 80, at 1372-73. Congress prohibited
the Service from issuing any regulations, revenue rulings, or other form of nationwide
guidance prior to July 1978 with respect to the taxation of fringe benefits. The Revenue Act
of 1978 included a similar provision that prohibited the Service from issuing any nationwide
guidance prior to January 1980 concerning the classification of employees and independent
contractors for federal tax purposes. 1978 Act, supra note 176.
178 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORTS ON STATUS OF IRS RESTRUCTURING AND
REFORM CR-1 (2001) [hereinafter CRS REPORTS]; Lederman, supra note 117, at 978.
179 CRS REPORTS, supra note 178, at CR-2.
"0 Id. at CR-I to CR-3; see also Ryan J. Donmoyer, GOP Opens IRS Horror Story Web
Site, 77 TAX NOTES 667 (Nov. 10 1997). Halloween was chosen as the date to unveil the
website, apparently because of its symbolic value.
181 U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Report on Allegations ofIRS Taxpayer Abuse,
2000 TNT 80-13 (Apr. 25, 2000) [hereinafter GAO Report]; see also Joe Spellman,
Conference Panel Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX NOTES 1854, 1854-55
(June 28, 1999) (discussing the hearings generally and mentioning the situation of John
Colaprete in particular).
182 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) [hereinafter RRA 1998]. RRA 1998 was
widely supported. Its original co-sponsors were Representatives Benjamin L. Cardin, a
Democrat, and Rob Portman, a Republican. It ultimately had forty-three co-sponsors, nineteen
Democrats and twenty-four Republicans. It passed in the House by a vote of 402 to eight and
in the Senate by a vote of ninety-six to two. GAO Report, supra note 181, at 80-13.
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1998 Reform Act "also contained an array of pro-taxpayer procedural
provisions, most of which were collected under the label 'Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 3,' the name for Title III of the Act, which contained over 70
provisions." 83 Some of the most important taxpayer protection provisions
restricted the Service's approaches to collection and the "collection due
process" procedures. 184 Finally, the "ten deadly sins" called for sanctioning
and termination of employment for a wide variety of Service employee
behavior. 185
The core concept was to view the taxpayer, not the government, as
client.186 As Commissioner Charles Rossotti stated, "[i]t is particularly
important that performance measures do not directly or indirectly cause
inappropriate behavior towards taxpayers, and that they provide incentives
for service-oriented behavior."1 87 The 1998 Reform Act was the first time
Congress was able to achieve relief for taxpayers.
Until the mid-1970s, taxpayers had limited recourse against the Service
for procedural disputes. 188 It was not until Congress created the Problem
Resolution Program (PRP) in 1976 that taxpayers were allowed procedural
recourse.189 The purpose of the PRP was to serve as a neutral body within the
Service to investigate complaints and remediate the problems. 190 This
revision was the first step in shifting the paradigm of power from a Service
perspective to a taxpayer-centric position. The primary problem with the PRP
system was its lack of authority to impose a final solution to disputes.19 1 The
most the body could do was request the Service action be stopped and
183 Lederman, supra note 1787, at 981.
184 Id.; see I.R.S. Policy Statement 5-100, I.R.M. 1.2.14.1.17 (Jan. 30, 1992).
185 Lederman, supra note 1787, at 981.
186 See supra note 112.
187 IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 105th Cong.
361 (1998) (Statement of Charles 0. Rossotti).
188 Heather B. Conoboy, A Wrong Step in the Right Direction: The National Taxpayer
Advocate and the 1998 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1401,
1403 (2000); Gardner & Norman, supra note 11, at 1358.
189 The Problem Resolution Program (PRP) was established in 1976 as part of the
Taxpayer Service Division and was spun off the following year as its own organization. H.R.
REP. No. 100-1104, at 215 (1988); Conoboy, supra note 188, at 1401-02; Gardner & Norman,
supra note 11, at 1358.
190 See Challenges Facing the National Taxpayer Advocate: Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. (1999) (Statement
of Cornelia M. Ashby, Associate Director, Tax Policy and Administration Issues).
191 Marjorie E. Komhauser, When Bad Things Happen to Good Taxpayers: A Tale of Two
Advocates, 1998 TNT 45-58 (Mar. 9, 1998).
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recommend possible ways to work out the problem.192 From this neutered
position, in 1979, the national taxpayer ombudsman was established to head
up the PRP.193 The purpose in creating the ombudsman position was to give
the office of PRP more authority and visibility. By centralizing the power in
a single individual, the ombudsman could advocate effectively for taxpayer
rights and interests. 194 Yet the underlying problem still persisted; the
ombudsman was not sufficiently independent of the Service.
By the inid-1980s it became evident that the ombudsman was
insufficient to truly protect taxpayer rights. In 1988, Congress responded by
enacting the first Taxpayer Bill of Rights.195 In response to taxpayer
testimony of Service abuse, the legislation was introduced in order to enhance
the procedural safeguards of the PRP.196 In the 1988 Taxpayer Bill of Rights,
there were requirements that the Service respect the taxpayer. For example,
the Service was required to have audits conducted at a time and place
convenient for the taxpayer and to protect the taxpayer's privacy by only
collecting information related to the specific inquiry.197
In the 1998 Reform Act, Congress significantly strengthened the
Taxpayer Advocate's role by giving the office direct communication
channels to Congress and by charging the position with performing "systemic
advocacy."' 98 The Taxpayer Advocate submits a very comprehensive annual
report to Congress each December. 199
The Taxpayer Advocate Service thus provides the structural mechanism
to pull taxpayers out of the automatic processing regime and put their
individual situations before the appropriate Service employee. As it
proclaims on its website, it is the voice of taxpayers within the Service. 200
192 Id1.
193 Id. 16.
194 Internal Revenue Serv., Taxpayer Advocate Releases Annual Report to Congress,
1999 TNT 8-11 (Jan. 13, 1999).
19' I.R.C. § 7811; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988); Gardner & Norman, supra note 11, at 1358.
196 Gardner & Norman, supra note 11, at 1358; Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Omnibus
Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act: Taxpayers Remedy or Political Placebo?, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1787, 1787-88 (1988).
197 Gardner & Norman, supra note 11, at 1358; Meland, supra note 196, at 1787-88.
198 Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers: Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax
System, FLA. TAX REV., 27 (2014) (transcript on file with author); Camp, Equal Protection,
supra note 6, at 284.
199 Examples of the National Taxpayer Advocate's Reports can be found at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Taxpayer-Advocate-Service-6 (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
200 See Camp, Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 275; The Taxpayer Advocate Service is
Your Voice at the IRS!, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Taxpayer-
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Further, a number of changes enhance the visibility and authority of local
taxpayer advocates. 201
Finally, the 1998 Reform Act established within the Treasury the Service
Oversight Board (Oversight Board).202 The stated purpose of the Oversight
Board is to oversee the Service in its administration, management, conduct,
direction, and supervision of the execution and application of the internal
revenue laws, related statutes, and tax conventions.203 As part of its general
oversight functions, the Oversight Board is also supposed to ensure that the
Service's organization and operation allow it to carry out its mission. Further,
the Oversight Board files annual reports to Congress.204
The Oversight Board, however, has neither the responsibility nor the
authority (1) to develop and formulate tax policy on existing or proposed
internal revenue laws, related statutes, and tax conventions; (2) to carry out
the Service's specific law enforcement activities, such as its examination,
collection, and criminal investigation functions; (3) to carry out the Service's
specific procurement activities; or (4) to execute specific personnel
actions.205
IV. CURRENT INCARNATION OF THE SERVICE
The Service may investigate any taxpayer at any time with or without
probable cause.206 A traditional investigatory scheme requires at minimum
that a crime has occurred; nonetheless, the Service can begin an investigation
based solely on a belief that the taxpayer has not complied with the law.207
Advocate-Service-Is-Your-Voice-at-the-IRS! (last visited Sept. 9, 2013).
201 Section 6212 of the Code has been amended to require that each notice of deficiency
must include a notice to the taxpayer that the taxpayer has the right to contact a local taxpayer
advocate and the location and telephone number of that taxpayer advocate's office.
202 I.R.C. § 7802(a), amended by 1998 Reform Act, supra note 11, § 1101.
203 I.R.C. § 7802(c), amended by 1998 Reform Act, supra note 11, § 1101.
204 See IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2012 (Feb. 7, 2013),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2013/IRSOB-Annual%2OReport
%202012.pdf.
205 See Henning, supra note 117, at 471; see generally FAQs, IRS OVERSIGHT BD.,
http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/faqs.shtml (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
206 United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 148 (1975); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (stating that an administrative agency subpoena has a
general power of inquisition, not unlike that of a grand jury and the agency may base its inquiry
on suspicion alone); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (holding
that where evidence sought is not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose, the
court should order the production of the evidence); Bryan T. Camp, What Good is the National
Taxpayer Advocate?, 126 TAx NOTEs 1243 (Mar. 8, 2010).
207 See sources cited supra note 198.
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The pushback against the Service is that once the investigatory system
begins, taxpayers tend to believe that the process is inquisitorial, not
adversarial. "An adversarial process separates the evidence-gatherer from the
decision-maker; it relies on multiple parties in interest to gather evidence and
present it to a passive, neutral decision-maker (either a judge or a jury)."208
Conversely, the inquisitorial system attempts to merge the roles, allowing the
neutral decision-maker to gather the information as part of the process. 209 To
effectively determine where the Service falls in the adversarial/inquisitorial
regime, an examination of the current system is necessary. From that position
an examination of whether the agency is properly executing the prosecutorial
discretion can take place.
Although it is not clear which system achieves fairer results for the
aggrieved, it is often argued that in the inquisitorial model a searcher-judge
would be best situated for truth seeking.210 It is often stated that the
inquisitorial approach is more efficient than the adversarial approach.211 The
efficiency of this approach depends, however, on the incentives of the fact
finder to conduct a thorough investigation and have correct findings of
208 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 18; see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1488 (1999) (arguing that
adversarial evidence-gathering ought to be, in theory, somewhat more efficient than
inquisitorial gathering).
209 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 18; Posner, supra note 208, at 1487. In fact,
most of Continental Europe, Japan, and other non-English speaking countries employ an
inquisitorial system. Posner, supra note 208, at 1487.
210 Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law Model
of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471 (1996) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER HARDING ET AL.,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1995)); Posner, supra note 208, at
1488.
211 Hein Kotz, The Reform of the Adversary System, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 478 (1981)
(reviewing MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980)); John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 866 (1985) ("The success of German
civil procedure stands as an enduring reproach to those who say that we must continue to suffer
adversary tricksters in the proof of fact."); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice
Reform in the United States - Opportunity for Learningfrom 'Civilized'European Procedure
Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147 (1994) (advocating reform in the
direction of inquisitorial systems and criticizing American lawyers for their unwillingness to
adopt foreign ideas); Franklin Strier, What Can the American Adversary System Learn from
an Inquisitorial System ofJustice?, 76 JUDICATURE 109 (1992) (arguing that some inquisitorial
practices "could beneficially be imported into our trial procedure"); Ellen E. Sward, Values,
Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302-03 (1989)
(concluding that nonadversarial elements in U.S. litigation, especially in complex litigation,
"promote sound values and contribute to a more effective system," but that perhaps adoption
of these nonadversarial elements requires abandonment of adversary ideology).
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fact.212 Moreover, public confidence in the process is degraded because the
process is hidden from public view.213 Neither is optimal for an enforcement
agency.
While the perceived efficiency of the inquisitorial model is less than
certain, it is often argued that the adversarial model is worse. There are
duplicative costs, the searchers are not disinterested, and the system needs
procedures to guard against manipulation. 214 The area of mass torts provides
a prime example of such failings. 2 15 Far too much money has been funneled
from victims to lawyers.216 Moreover, in the area of mass tort litigation, the
adversarial system has failed to provide consistent results. 2 17 This also is
suboptimal.
In most administrative law constructs, the agency in question employs
an inquisitorial system; this includes tax administration. 218 The quintessential
purpose of the agency is to determine the truth through the inquisitorial
system.219 The fundamental question, though, is whether or not the
administrative state is better or more efficient than are courts in conducting
the inquisitorial process.
Despite the populist rhetoric that the most efficient mechanism to deal
with large-scale problems is through an agency-based inquisitorial model, the
reality is that most models are inefficient in practice. 220 In the mass tort
world, the tobacco industry was able to create a Congressional approach to
the settlement. Notwithstanding bipartisan support for a Congressional
settlement approach, the industry stopped the action.221 The tobacco
212 Posner, supra note 208, at 1488.
213 id.
214 Id. at 1490.
215 Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J.
1983, 2016 (1999).
216 Deborah R. Hensler, Fashioning a National Resolution ofAsbestos Personal Injury
Litigation: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1967, 1977 (1992)
(citing JAMES A. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1983) [hereinafter RAND
STUDY]). The RAND Study's thirty-nine percent compensation figure dates back to the early
1980s and reflects transaction costs from a period when asbestos litigation had not fully
matured as a mass tort litigation. Erichson, supra note 215, at 2016.
217 Erichson, supra note 215, at 2016.
218 Camp, Administration, supra note I1, at 19-20.
219 Id. at 18-19; Erichson, supra note 215, at 2006-07.
220 Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005).
221 David E. Rosenbaum, Lott Wants Tobacco Bill Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1998,
at A 14. Assured that the bill lacked the sixty votes needed for cloture, Senator Trent Lott called
for the cloture vote. Three votes short, the bill was sent back to committee, and supporters
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litigation highlights one of the problems with the inquisitorial model: capture
by affected groups.
A. Service Failure as an Inquisitorial Agency
The Service as an agency employs an inquisitorial system, as described
above. 222 It is both the decision maker and the searcher of evidence. In that
dual role, the Service will fail for lack of the ultimate litigation authority to
defend its position. The DOJ Pronouncement highlights not only the capture
of the Service by the DOJ, but also the lack of the Service's ability to be a
truth gatherer. First, the Service is effectively captured by the DOJ through
the prosecutorial relationship between the two agencies. Second, the DOJ
Pronouncement compels the Service to gather support for a position that does
not represent what the ultimate prosecutor believes to be true.
The mechanism Congress enacted delegating the authority of the Service
to determine the taxpayer's liability created the aforementioned inquisitional
system. Under section 6201 of the Code, the Service is authorized "to make
the inquires, determinations, and assessments of all taxes." 223 By the very
definition of the scope of its authority, the Service is designed to both inquire
into the amount owed and decide on the liability resulting in an assessment.
Although the assessment does not create a tax liability,224 it serves as the
Service's administrative judgment of the tax liability.225
1. Taxpayer Responsibility in Self-Reporting System
The goal of the Service determination process is to create an assessment.
There are two mechanisms in which the Service assesses the taxpayer. The
primary method is through the filing of the taxpayer return. Under the self-
assessment system of reporting, taxpayers are required to file an accurate
account of taxes owed.226 Failure to do so is a felony and there are additional
acknowledged that there was little chance of reviving the bill within the year. Erichson, supra
note 215, at 2022-23; see also David E. Rosenbaum, The Tobacco Bill: The Overview; Senate
Drops Tobacco Bill with '98 Revival Unlikely; Clinton Lashes Out at G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 1998, at Al.
222 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 19-20.
223 I.R.C. § 6201; see also Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 20.
224 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 20.
225 An assessment is the functional equivalent of a judgment. Cohen v. Gross, 316 F.2d
521, 522-23 (3d Cir. 1963); see Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 21.
226 I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(B), 7206(1); S. REP. No. 94-938, at 318 (1976) (regarding
disclosure to other government agencies, the Senate Finance Committee "tried to balance the
particular office or agency's need for the information involved with the citizen's right to
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negligence and substantial understatement penalties. 227 If the taxpayer has a
"reasonable basis" for taking the reporting position, the penalties may be
abated.228
The core reporting issue facing taxpayers is that the real world is far from
certain. The tax law is itself vague and ambiguous. 229 If a taxpayer must
produce a "true and correct" return and vagrancies exist, is the taxpayer
required to take the least favorable position? Under the inquisitorial system,
the taxpayer should be producing a return that takes the most favorable
position that is at least as likely as not to prevail if challenged. 230 There are
essentially three tax litigation standards: "substantial authority," "more likely
than not," and "reasonable basis." 231 If the system structure was adversarial,
then the trier of fact would weigh both positions and make a neutral decision.
Aggressive taxpayer positions, although permitted in the adversarial system,
in the inquisitorial system would undermine the self-assessment standards. 232
privacy and the related impact of disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with our
country's voluntary assessment system"); Calvin Johnson, True and Correct: Standards for
Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAX NOTES 1521 (June 19, 1989); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative
Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 449-50 (2008); Brett Wells, Voluntary Compliance:
This Return Might be Correct but Probably Isn't, 29 VA. TAX REv. 645, 670-71 (2010).
227 I.R.C. § 6662(d); see also Johnson, supra note 226, at 3; Wells, supra note 226, at
661-62.
228 I.R.C. § 6664(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a); see also Johnson, supra note 226, at 3;
Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing
the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX. J. 1, 6-8 (2008); Wells, supra note 226, at 661-
62.
229 Johnson, supra note 226, at 3.
230 Id. at 4; Working Draft of Chapters 1-4 and 8 of the Civil Tax Penalties Report by the
Executive Task Force of the Internal Revenue Commissioner's Penalty Study, Circulated to
Members of the Commissioner's Advisory Group, 237 DAILY TAX REP. L-10, L-33-4 (Dec. 9,
1988).
231 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6694-2(b)(1), 1.6694-2(d)(2) (2009); see also Scott A. Schumacher,
Macniven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using "Purposive Textualism" to Deal with Tax
Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax Advice, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 33, 67-68 (2008) ("For
example, the 2007 amendments to § 6694 provide, in essence, that a practitioner may not
advise a taxpayer to take a position on a return unless the position has a more likely than not
chance of success or the position is disclosed to the [Service]. However, under § 6662(d), a
taxpayer may take a position on a return without disclosure as long as the position meets the
lower standard of 'substantial authority."'); Ventry, supra note 226, at 449-50.
232 Unlike the individual setting, the Service requires corporations to file an uncertain tax
position form in the corporate setting. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, Requests for
Documents Provided to Independent Auditors, Policy of Restraint and Uncertain Tax
Positions, I.R.B. 2010-41 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2010-
41_IRB/arl 2.html; Brett Wells, New Schedule UTP: "Uncertain Tax Positions In The Age Of
Transparency", 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 392, 408-09 (2011).
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Since the 1998 Reform Act, the structure is such that the Service's
mission is to collect the proper amount of tax efficiently and fairly. 233 The
Service must maximize the voluntary taxpayer compliance through
appropriate standards. Audits and penalties are to serve the subsidiary
function of encouraging accurate self-assessment.234 This mission correlates
to the inquisitional system.
Since the premise is that the taxpayer must self-assess in an accurate
manner, and the Service has limited resources, the vast majority of the returns
are accepted as filed.235 Thus, although a technical determination, by
accepting the return the Service assesses the tax liability as shown on the
return. 236 One of the primary problems with the lack of review is that
taxpayers fail to comply unless an appropriate penalty regime is in place.237
2. Audit
As previously stated, the taxpayer, in areas that are not settled, may take
a position on his tax return that has a "realistic possibility of success." 238 if
the taxpayer has decided that he has a foundation for a different position, he
is not required to disclose the position on his return. 239 The Service must
investigate in a more thorough manner the taxpayer's return for compliance.
The audit function operates primarily to ensure taxpayer compliance
with the Service's position of the law.240 An examining agent begins the
review by examining the return for issue spotting and fact finding.241 The
Service does not grant the examining agent any true authority to make a
233 The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last visited Aug.
13, 2007); see also IRM 8.1.1.4 (2003) ("The mission of the service is to encourage and
achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary compliance with the tax laws and regulations
and to conduct itself so as to warrant the highest degree of public confidence in its integrity
and efficiency.").
234 IRM 1.1.1.1 (2011); Johnson, supra note 226, at 4.
235 This is the so-called "audit lottery," stating that less than 0.1% of returns are audited.
2002 SERV. REPORT, supra note 117, at 6; Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 22-23.
236 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 22.
237 Herzig, supra note 6, at 1058-59; Leaderman Proposal, supra note 6, at 1197; Ventry,
supra note 226, at 433.
238 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985); Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007); Lavoie, supra note 228, at 5.
239 Lavoie, supra note 228, at 5.
240 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 22-23.
241 IRM 8.1.1.1 (2003); IRM 8.1.1.3 (2006).
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determination of the law.242 Rather, the examining agent is instructed to raise
all meritorious issues.243 The only restraint is the examining agent taking a
"strained construction" of the statute.244
Once the examining agent finishes the examination, a report is prepared
and is submitted to a first-level manager. 245 At that point if the manager
approves the report, then the Service will either: (1) assess the tax (if it is
assessable); (2) send out a Notice of Deficiency (the colloquial "ninety day
letter") if the tax is immediately assessable because it is a deficiency; or (3)
send a notice that the Service intends to send a Notice of Deficiency (the
"thirty day letter").246
If during the examination period the taxpayer either cannot reach an
agreement with the examining agent or disputes the findings of the agent,
then the taxpayer can appeal the decision through the Service's Appeals
Office. 247 It is important to note that if the taxpayer plans to obtain a judicial
review via a refund claim (as opposed to a deficiency), the administrative
process outlined in the Code must first be exhausted. 248 The appeals agent
reviews the examining agent's report and may investigate new issues.24 9
After this initial review, the Appeals Office has the authority to weigh the
legal merits of the issues and to make offers and compromise. 250
The appeals process, unlike the examination and assessment processes,
is similar to the adversarial construct. Taxpayers and the Service treat the
process similar to litigation. The Service takes an aggressive position the
same as they would in litigation. 251 The Appeals Office has various options
242 Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689; Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 24-26;
Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10; Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases 'Oral History Interview'
ofFormer Commissioner Caplin, 94 TNT 120-25 (June 22, 1994).
243 See supra note 242.
244 Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689; IRM 31.1.1.1 (Aug. 11, 2004); IRM 32.2.1.1
(Aug. 11,2004); IRM 33.2.2.3 (Oct. 28, 2010); see also Camp, Administration, supra note 11,
at 24-26; Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10-11.
245 MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 10.02 (2d
ed. 2002); Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 24.
246 SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 245, T 10.02; Camp, Administration, supra note 11,
at 23-24.
241 IRM 8.1.1.1 (2003); IRM 8.1.1.3 (2006); Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 24;
Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10.
248 I.R.C. § 7422(a).
249 IRM 8.1.1.1 (2003); IRM 8.1.1.3 (2003); IRM 8.6.1.4.2 (2001); Camp,
Administration, supra note 11, at 24; Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10.
250 IRM 8.1.1.1 (2003); IRM 8.1.1.3 (2003); IRM 8.6.1.4.2 (2001); Camp,
Administration, supra note 11, at 24-25; Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10.
251 Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10-11.
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after its initial review. The matter can be sent back to Examinations for
further investigation and review. 252 The Appeals Office can settle the matter
through the offer and compromise process. 253 The settlement process is
clearly defined by the adversarial process. The entire process of examination
and appeals requires the agency to take the most aggressive position as
allowed under law. That position is articulated under Revenue Procedure 64-
22, stating that the Service should take a position that is most in favor of the
collection of revenue.254 This literal interpretation allows the Service to settle
cases utilizing a litigation risk assessments. 255 Essentially, if the Service
believes that it has a thirty percent chance of winning a case, then a settlement
may be proffered at thirty percent of the tax liability. 256 The hybridized
process of an inquisitional and adversarial process creates the initial taxpayer
dissatisfaction and negative perception of the agency.
Finally, if no agreement is reached during the appeals process, then
Appeals may issue a Notice of the Deficiency.257 If a Notice of Deficiency is
issued, then the taxpayer has ninety days to either pay the tax (and perhaps
sue for a refund) or go to Tax Court.258 Once the Notice of Deficiency is
issued, it carries the full weight of an agency decision. 259
Once the Notice of Deficiency has been issued, if the taxpayer elects to
pay the tax, then the taxpayer may sue for refund. When a taxpayer requests
a refund of taxes already paid, the Service either rejects the claim or fails to
act within six months.260 Though the refund process sounds simplistic and is
often cited by courts as an adequate remedy, refund claims are subject to
thorough administrative review by the Service. 261 In other words, by
252 IRM 8.6.1.4.2 (2001).
253 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 24-25; Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10-11.
254 Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
255 Lavoie, supra note 228, at 10-11; George Guttman, News Analysis: IRS Avenges:
Winning Little, Losing Big, 61 TAX NOTES 155, 156 (Oct. 11, 1993).
256 See supra note 255.
257 IRM 8.2.1.9.2 (1999); Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 25.
258 I.R.C. §§ 6211(a), 6212(a), 6213(a) (defining and authorizing deficiencies and
petitions); see also Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying General
Federal Pleading to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 183, 192-203
(1996).
259 Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 23-24; see, e.g., Meserve Drilling Partners
v. Commissioner, 152 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998); Edwards v. Commissioner, 84
T.C.M. (CCH) 24 (2002).
260 See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (stating that a taxpayer must exhaust administrative remedies
with the Service before pursuing a refund claim in court); I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1).
261 See Treas. Reg. § 601.105(e)(2) (1987) (stating that the examination of refund claims
is subject to the same procedure and level of scrutiny as general audits).
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submitting a refund claim, a taxpayer subjects herself to the equivalent of a
second audit. The Service obtains a second bite at the apple and now has
greater incentives based in the adversarial model to create a more favorable
litigation position. In order to collect the most amount of revenue for the fisc,
the Service should attempt to find additional issues and claim underpayment.
Obviously, the refund route, as opposed to going to Tax Court, creates
additional hurdles and risks for taxpayers that the deficiency route does not.
B. Litigation Problems with the Service's Self-Representation
Once the audit and appeals process plays out and the taxpayer ends up
in Tax Court, Federal Court of Claims, or district court, the problems
associated with the Service posturing during the assessment process continue
to manifest themselves. There are two primary problems associated with the
Service self-representation. 262 First, the underlying assessment that provides
the foundation for the litigation is given judicial deference. Second, the
Service represents both the agency as well as a neutral collector of the tax.
This dichotomy affects several areas, including the Service's position that it
is not required to take similar litigation positions in different circuits. Finally,
because the Service does not ultimately represent itself through the entire
litigation process, it is subject to capture by another administrative agency -
the DOJ.
1. Dual Service Duties
The tension between the dual masters to which the Service is beholden
can be seen in the final prong of the controversy process in Tax Court. The
Office of Chief Counsel represents the Service in Tax Court. Through the
policies established in the Chief Counsel Directives Manual,263 the Service
imposes duties on its office to taxpayers. 264 This dual role is inconsistent with
true adversarial litigation in that the Chief Counsel does not always advocate
to protect the fisc. 265 The Chief Counsel does not represent the Service in a
traditional attorney-client relationship. The objective of the Service is not to
win at all costs, but rather to apply the tax laws impartially and apply a correct
262 There are also more problems such as the power of the court and the differing burdens
of proof. See, e.g., Herzig, supra note 6; Lederman, supra note 117; Pietruszkiewicz, supra
note 10.
263 IRM 30.1.1.2 (Aug. 11, 2004).
264 Michelle M. Kwon, The Tax Man's Ethics: Four ofthe Hardest Ethical Questions for
an IRS Lawyer, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 371, 381 (2011).




interpretation of the law for the best interest of the public. 266
The Chief Counsel exercises restraint by informing taxpayers of
appropriate statues of limitations and ensuring assessments are correct among
many items. This restraint is especially necessary because the majority of
taxpayers are not represented by counsel.267 The Chief Counsel acts as an
advocate for the legal process and not merely an advocate for his or her
client.268 Therefore, under the current paradigm, the Chief Counsel is
hamstrung in its representation of the fisc. This is particularly true when
examining the lack of restraint the DOJ exercises in district court.
The DOJ is limited in its posturing only by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In fact since the DOJ represents the Commissioner, additional
hurdles may be set forth because of privilege matters. For example, in
Marriott International Resorts L.P. v. United States,269 the Federal Circuit
reversed the Court of Federal Claims and upheld the government's assertion
of executive privilege, finding that Service Delegation Order No. 220 (April
16, 1997) permits the Commissioner to delegate the assertion of this privilege
to a subordinate, an Assistant Chief Counsel. 270 There is no compulsion to
exercise restraint, as there is for the Chief Counsel. Rather, there is incentive
266 Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689 (directing Service employees to "find the true
meaning" of the tax laws rather than "adopt a strained construction in the belief that [they are]
'protecting the revenue'); IRM 35.6.2.9 (Aug. 11, 2004) ("Respondent counsel's obligation
as a public servant is to assist the court to reach the correct result, even if it is adverse to
respondent's original determination" and should offer "all available evidence of material
facts . . . to help the court make a proper ruling."); IRM 39.1.1.1(2) (Aug. 11, 2004) (Chief
Counsel lawyers are "to provide the answer that most accurately reflects the meaning of the
tax code" rather than "an answer that is most beneficial to the government."); Kwon, supra
note 264, at 411.
267 Kwon, supra note 264, at 379 ("There were 30,680 cases docketed in the Tax Court
in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, of which 23,837 cases (77.7%) were pro se cases
where taxpayers represented themselves.").
268 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. I (1983) (describing a prosecutor in a
criminal case as a "minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate"); Kwon, supra note
264, at 382. The role of the Service lawyer may also be viewed as less of an advocate and
more of an advisor. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREAMBLE [1]. A lawyer acting as
an advocate "zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."
Id. By contrast, an advisor gives a client "an informed understanding of the client's rights and
obligations and explains their practical implications." Id.
269 437 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
270 See also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-608, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124049 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2009) (the DOJ trial attorney and Service attorney who
had advised the audit team asserted the deliberative process privilege, and the court required
the Service Commissioner, an Assistant Chief Counsel, or an "appropriately high-ranking
non-litigation team member" to present an affidavit asserting the privilege within thirty days
to prevent disclosure of the documents.).
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to win the cases tried at all costs. 27 1
An example of aforementioned disparate litigation positions can be
gleaned from a cursory examination of the scope of discovery in Tax Court
compared to that in district court. Since the Service assessment is deemed
correct, in Tax Court, the scope of discovery under the Tax Court Rules is
generally narrower than in either the district courts or the Court of Federal
Claims. Underlying the overall discovery process in Tax Court is the
principle that discovery is not to be utilized unless the parties are unable to
obtain the information on an informal basis.272 Except in limited situations,
discovery depositions in the Tax Court are available only by mutual
agreement. 273 The ability to depose nonparty witnesses is also more
restrictive in the Tax Court.
There are further restrictions in Tax Court. First, there are only bench
trials not juries. There is a strict mandatory stipulation process under which
the parties are required to develop as full a statement of nonprivileged,
relevant facts as the parties can reach.274 A stipulation is treated as a
conclusive admission binding on all parties for which it has been
submitted.275
Discovery in both the district court and Court of Federal Claims, by
contrast, is subject to more liberal and broader rules. Even within the
confines of the mandatory disclosure obligations imposed by the December
1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery in the
district courts remains quite expansive in comparison to the Tax Court's
rules. DOJ attorneys can be expected to utilize discovery broadly within the
confines of the applicable rules of procedure in the district courts and Court
of Federal Claims in preparing the government's defense to the taxpayer's
refund action.
2. Settlement Authority
There are many stops during the assessment process at which the dispute
271 See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analyst, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (the Tax Division of
the DOJ receives a copy of every federal court tax decision, which it classifies as a "win,
partial win, or loss," and files for use in possible appeals); Peterson, supra note 55, at 334
(1991) (noting that the government turned its attention in Point II (Brief for the United
States, United States v. Tenzer, No. 96-1653, at 42-62 (2d Cir. 2000) to developing the
argument that even if Tenzer had met all the requirements of the policy, the government had
no obligation to refrain from prosecuting him).
272 Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691 (1974); T.C. R. 75(b).
273 T.C. R. 74.
274 T.C. R. 91.
275 T.C. R. 91(e).
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may be resolved. One of the problems with the current construct, however, is
that while the Service has established the frame of the inquiry through the
audit phase, in the appeals and litigation phase taxpayers may only fight the
law. The result of the misapplication of law is discussed below in the Golsen
context. Prior to a discussion of the application of law, however, it is helpful
to outline the actual authority to settle matters in dispute.
The Attorney General has the authority to settle a refund suit at any stage
of the proceeding after the suit has been referred to the DOJ.276 The office
carries the inherent power to agree to a compromise in any litigation in which
the DOJ represents the United States. This inherent authority gives the
Attorney General broad power and flexibility, thus affording the DOJ the
opportunity to settle a case for reasons of strategy rather than solely for
reasons based on the merits. The authority to settle refund suits is delegated
by the Attorney General to different officials in the DOJ according to the
amount of the concession by the government. 277 Most of the settlement
authority turns on the Service agreeing with the settlement. Only the
Assistant Attorney General can resolve a disagreement between the Service
and the person in the Tax Division who otherwise would have settlement
authority, with respect to a proposed settlement.
To settle cases, the Service has limited settlement authority. Generally,
the Chiefs of the Trial and Appellate Sections may settle refund suits less
than $500,000 in concessions. While amounts above $500,000 but less than
$2 million require approval of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 278
section 6405(a) of the Code requires that the Joint Committee on Taxation
review all refunds of income, estate, or gift taxes (as well as certain other
taxes) in excess of $2 million. 279 The DOJ is not bound to follow the views
of the Joint Committee and has on occasion proceeded to settle cases without
the Joint Committee's concurrence. 280
This begs the question: why is there a check-and-balance system in the
276 I.R.C. § 7122(a).
277 Tax Division Redelegations of Authority to Compromise and Close Civil Claims, 72
Fed. Reg. 65457 (Nov. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R., pt. 0, app. to subpart Y).
278 See Craig M. Boise, Playing with "Monopoly Money": Phony Profits, Fraud
Penalties and Equity, 90 MINN. L. REv. 144,209-10 (2005); Greenaway, supra note 6, at 324-
25.
279 I.R.C. § 6405(a); see Boise, supra note 278, at 209-10; Greenaway, supra note 6, at
324; Amandeep S. Grewal, The Congressional Revenue Service, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2014). Although the statute does not specifically refer to settlements by the DOJ,
it is the practice and policy of the DOJ to request the review of the Joint Committee with
respect to all proposed refunds in excess of $2 million and to await the views of the Committee
before authorizing those refunds.
280 Boise, supra note 278, at 210-11; Grewal, supra note 6, at 5.
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DOJ settlement paradigm? I argue that it is because of the adversarial nature
of the litigation. Having unchecked prosecutorial discretion is not optimal in
the area of impartial collection of taxes. Thus, it is necessary to ensure a fair
and impartial application of the tax law. So why is none of these checks in
place for the Service through Appeals and the Tax Court? In fact, a more
expansive settlement regime is in place through the acquiescence or
nonacquiescence positions by the Service.
3. Nonbinding Court Positions
It is impossible to know how often the Service takes inconsistent
positions during the assessment phase. "Most transactions between taxpayers
and the [Service] are subject to privacy rules and do not become matters of
public record." 281 Essentially, the Service is able take any posture of the
liability and the theory of the tax law, then agree to settle the case without
any public disclosure. In the "Star Chamber" world of Service assessment,
no statistics are kept or even any redacted settlement agreements offered for
public guidance. The Service can take any position, no matter how
unreasonable, and unless the case moves to litigation and the litigation
actually results in a verdict,282 the agency has no accountability.
The problem of pinning the Service down on a theory is further
exacerbated by a precedent problem. The Service may disagree with the
district court opinions. In those cases, the Service may issue a nonaquiesence
letter stating that it will not be bound to a lower court precedent until the
Court has concluded on the matter.283 The only restriction on the Service's
ability to take a contradictory position is the Golsen rule.284 The Tax Court
in applying precedential authority will apply the rule of the Court of Appeals,
281 Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making
anda Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 568 (2010); see also I.R.C. § 6103.
282 Leandra Lederman, What Do Courts Have to Do with It?: The Judiciary's Role in
Making Tax Law, 65 NAT'L TAx J. 899 (2012).
283 IRM 8.22.2.4.8.1. Even if the issue is framed as a question of "law" (as the court
framed it in Crawford v. U.S., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2006)), it generally takes more
than one trial court opinion to convince the decision-makers within the Service to change an
institutional position. For example, it took the decisions of five different circuit courts over a
three-year period before the Service abandoned its systemic practice of reviving a tax liability
when, due to a clerical error, it erroneously refunded a payment to the taxpayer. For a more
complete description, see Camp, Failure, supra note 74, at 95; Bryan T. Camp, The Mysteries
ofErroneous Refunds, 114 TAX NOTES 231 (Jan. 17, 2007).
284 Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971);
Andre L. Smith, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions of Law: Promoting Expertise,
Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 TAX LAw. 361, 374 (2005).
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if the court has opined on the issue. In Golsen, the court held, "where the
Court of Appeals to which appeal lies has already passed upon the issue
before us, efficient and harmonious judicial administration calls for us to
follow the decision of that court." 285 The only exception occurs when the Tax
Court and a district court have decided an issue differently, and neither case
has been appealed.
Prior to Golsen, much like the earlier DOMA posit, taxpayers could
receive different rulings depending on whether the case was tried in district
court or Tax Court. Since the Tax Court is an article I, not article III, court, it
is not bound to follow any circuit court's precedent and could decide an issue
contrary to the litigating taxpayer's circuit's rule of law. The rhetoric leading
up to Golsen was the same as in the DOMA context: those who could avoid
the Tax Court by paying the tax would, while poorer taxpayers are stuck with
the incorrect Tax Court rule.
Within the Chief Counsel's office, the Director of the Tax Litigation
Division has delegated the authority to prepare and approve
recommendations of acquiescence and nonacquiescence. 286 The mechanism
for providing notice to the public is through Actions on Decisions, which
detail the reasons for the Division's determination. 287 Although the Internal
Revenue Manual gives general guidance to the Action on Decision preparer,
it provides no specific guidance on when nonacquiescence should be
recommended in lieu of acquiescence.
The Service is theoretically designed to achieve a fair result in the
impartial collection and assessment of taxation. Yet constant failure to clarify
positions or to have structural guidelines and accountability does not create
certainty for taxpayers. This friction is a direct result of the agency's hybrid
use of the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. In order to ensure the proper
self-assessment, the Service utilizes uncertainty. It has been commented:
Of all the agencies of the government, the worst offender against
sound principles in the use of precedents may be the Internal
Revenue Service. . . . Its basic attitude is that because consistency is
impossible, an effort to be consistent is unnecessary; therefore it
need not consider precedents, and it may depart from precedents
without explaining why. 288
285 Golsen, 54 T.C. at 757.
286 IRM (30)312.3 (July 19, 1984).
287 IRM (30)1173.21 (June 7, 1983).
288 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8:12 at 206, 208-09 (2d
ed. 1979); see also Johnson, supra note 281, at 569.
2013] 45
Virginia Tax Review
Yet the Service does not need to be forced into a Golsen posture. It could
increase certainty by providing more regulatory or administrative guidance
or making such guidance more clear.289 Unfortunately, the Service does not
issue more actions on decisions, 290 issue advance rulings on tax questions,
disclose advance rulings provided to taxpayers, or forgo litigation of unclear
tax issues.291
Because of the systematic failure of the Service that allows the
uncertainty to exist, the Service does not live up to the stated goal of clarity.
Chief Counsel Lester Uretz once said, "[t]he policies which guide decisions
as to whether to acquiesce reflect the Service's two major objectives: to
handle tax controversies fairly, efficiently, and expeditiously in order to
avoid needless litigation, and to achieve the maximum possible uniformity
and consistency of treatment among similarly situated taxpayers." 292 Thus
when given the opportunity to end litigation and to establish stable, nationally
uniform rules of law through acquiescence, the Commissioner should
acquiesce. Yet if the acquiescence does not create uniformity, then there
should be no acquiescence.
To the extent that this has been studied empirically, it is shown this was
not the result.293 The study tested 245 acquiescences and nonacquiescences
over a five-year period.294 Based on the above model of uniformity, the study
concluded that "on an overall basis for the five sample years, and for the
sample years individually," the Commissioner was no more likely to
acquiesce in situations where uniformity would be an immediate result than
in other cases.295 Moreover, the Chief Counsel mentioned the goal of national
289 See Sarah Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 1017, 1072 (2009); Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64
TAX L. REV. 489, 495 (2011).
290 Actions on decision are statements as to the Service's future litigation position
regarding a court decision. Actions on Decision (AOD), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/actionsOnDecisions.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
291 Lawsky, supra note 289, at 1072; Osofsky, supra note 289, at 495.
292 Lester R. Uretz, The Chief Counsel's Policy Regarding Acquiescence and
Nonacquiescence in Tax Court Cases, 14 TAX COUNS. Q. 129, 141 (1970).
293 GARY W. CARTER, THE ACQUIESCENCE/NONACQUIESCENCE POLICY OF THE
COMMISSIONER WITH RESPECT TO TAX COURT DECISIONS - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 100-03
(1985) (Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the University of Texas at Austin). Admittedly, this
is just one study; however, no other work has been done on the issue.
294 Id. at 102.
295 Id. at 103. The sample years were 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1980. These years
spanned two Republican administrations and one Democratic administration. During the
sample period, four persons held the position of Commissioner and four persons occupied the
Chief Counsel's office. This suggests that there is no apparent reason why the results achieved
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uniformity as a contributory reason for his recommendation of acquiescence
in only one case examined.296
V. A REIMAGINED SERVICE
From the premise that any incremental improvement is beneficial, I
ultimately argue that the Service should be reformed. In order to envision a
different incarnation of the Service, I examined the nonstatic nature of the
agency. Examining the historic Service with the articulated current goal of
the agency, its proximity to the proper function within the construct of
efficient and fair collection of taxes can be examined. The 1998 goals are no
closer today than they were 15 years ago. Thus, extra protections must be
afforded for taxpayers. The optimal protection for taxpayers would be a
removal of prosecutorial discretion from the Service.
Because of the DOJ's separation from the Service, the refund attorneys
should be expected to analyze and present a tax refund case more objectively
and independently than would their counterparts from the district counsel's
office.297 Although the DOJ works with the Chief Counsel's office, there is
no vested interest in protecting the underlying investigation or the impact of
internal process or policies of the assessment side of the tax law. Meanwhile,
the Chief Counsel, under the current construct must, as a practical matter,
consider the views of the local Service representatives involved in the
administrative development of the controversy. 298
The independent nature of the DOJ can be seen by its willingness to
"confess error in cases when, upon review, we realize that the Government
would be different in current and future administrations. Id.
296 See Mirsky v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 664 (1974), action on dec., 1749-69, 5135-69
(Aug. 25, 1972). The Chief Counsel referred to the Tax Court opinion that noted the
congressional objective of nationally uniform tax treatment of payments to a divorced spouse,
irrespective of differences in local law terminology.
297 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) ("The
responsibility of the public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict."); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-1.2(C) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not
merely to convict."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1993) ("A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.");
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612
(1999); Michael Herz, "Do Justice!": Variations ofa Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REv. Ill
(1996); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Symposium, Batson Ethics For Prosecutors and Trial Court
Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 475, 505 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 46 (1991).
298 Peterson, supra note 55, at 335.
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has successfully advanced an erroneous position." 299 Whether that is for
strategic or other reasons, the DOJ has this autonomy. Clear tension exists in
this strange relationship. For example, the DOJ may confess error after a Tax
Court decision where the Service has pressed a position that the DOJ
ultimately determines to have been wrong. 300 Obviously, such a
determination might be deemed controversial with what the DOJ believes is
"our client agency, the Internal Revenue Service." 30 1
The practical effect of the DOJ's ultimate authority over the proper
posturing of a case through district court, Court of Claims, or the federal
appellate courts is that it is the "final arbiter of the litigating positions that
will be advanced on behalf of the United States." 302 Despite the false
narrative that the Chief Counsel and the DOJ act independently, the DOJ has
a clear view of the subservient nature of the Chief Counsel. If the premise
established by former Assistant Attorney General Patterson is true and the
DOJ views the Service as a client, it follows that consultation would occur
and more often than not an agreement would be reached.303 From the
perspective of the DOJ, the Service is a client and the attorney, the DOJ, has
the authority to make the ultimate position on the law.
So why then would the Service be required to take a position that is
contrary to the ultimate litigation position of the DOJ? There is a real
disconnect between the practical application of the intra-agency structure and
the theoretical construct of the Tax Court. Without the Service representing
itself in Tax Court the DOJ Pronouncement would not result in disparate
treatment of taxpayers in differing courts. This disparate treatment is a direct
result of the Service taking a position that the DOJ believes untenable. We
are left then to discuss how the Service can be redesigned to prevent this
problem in the future.
Layered upon this micro problem is the more macro problem of creating
a Service that more accurately reflects the goals of the 1998 Reform Act.
There appears to be two ways to avoid the micro problem: (1) giving the
Service litigation authority in all tax matters, and (2) giving the DOJ
exclusive litigation authority in all tax matters. A removal of litigation
authority most closely aligns to the policy goals of the 1998 Reform Act.
Moreover, even under the most expansive construct known, before the Court,
the Solicitor General, with some notable exceptions, controls all aspects of
299 id
3 Green, supra note 297, at 612; Herz, supra note 297, at 117; Peterson, supra note 55,
at 335-36.





independent agency litigation, including the power to seek certiorari.
Ultimately, even if the Service is granted litigation authority, the ultimate
decision is still with the DOJ.304 Although there are "turf wars" inherent in
the change of agency autonomy, the Service has gone through these changes
before.
A. Reallocation ofLitigation Authority to the DOJ
An essential attribute of agency autonomy is the power to manage its
own litigation and to represent itself in court.305 For decades it has been
argued that independent agencies should have the power to litigate through
the Court. The argument is that "[1]egal policymaking is a critical feature of
independent agency decision-making; full control of litigating authority is,
therefore, essential to independent agency autonomy." 306 The Service is not
an independent agency, rather, an executive agency. The premise, though,
would be to allow the Service similar independent agency characteristics.
Congress has reallocated litigation authority to agencies in the recent
past.307 The instances in which Congress acted usually involve perceived
failures, often in enforcement. 308 In the posited situation, the DOJ is refusing
to defend DOMA in a tax case. In Windsor, after advocating against DOMA
304 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 786
(Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub
nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 113 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (although the Court
may decide differently in Windsor and Perry).
305 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 255, 256 (1994).
306 Id. at 260.
307 Two independent agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), may represent themselves before the Court whenever the
Solicitor General refuses to defend their position. ICC power dates back to 1910, Pub. L. No.
475, ch. 231, § 212, 36 Stat. 1087, 1150-51 (1911), and has been reaffirmed several times.
This authority may also extend to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The NLRB enjoys independent litigating authority under
its statute, but the statute does not speak to the issue of Court representation. 29 U.S.C. §§
154(a), 155, 160(j), 160(1), 161(2) (1988). The TVA lacks specific authority to represent itself
before the Court. The historic practice here, however, is for the TVA to assert complete
independence. In fact, when the TVA and Solicitor General jointly present a case to the Court,
the TVA General Counsel insists that his name appear above the names of Solicitor General
attorneys (except for the Solicitor General himself). See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 1, Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701) (indicating the name of the General
Counsel for the TVA above the names of the other Solicitor General attorneys but under the
name of the Solicitor General).
308 Devins, supra note 305, at 307.
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consistent with the DOJ Pronouncement, the Second Circuit found DOMA
unconstitutional.3 09 The DOJ via the Solicitor General refused to petition the
Court for certiorari. Frustrated with the position of the DOJ, the House of
Representatives anointed the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) to
petition the Court. Although certiorari was granted, an initial question was
asked by the Court: whether BLAG has article III standing. 310 Congress has
used grants of independent litigating authority to legislative entities such as
the Comptroller General and the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel to ensure
the vigorous defense of its priorities. 311 Here, the DOJ has failed to protect
the fisc by refusing to enforce DOMA. Congress reacted to this failure by
appointing independent counsel. In the event that the Court finds this counsel
has no standing or if Congress does not want to have to be pressed into similar
action again in the future, then Congress may desire to expand the Service's
litigation authority.
B. The Service's Loss ofAgency Authority
One of the principles that advocates for expanding agency powers,
especially in the litigation arena, is that failure to do so erodes the ability of
the agency to effectively regulate. Through the stick of litigation, the agency
has the power to enforce its own rules. By removing the stick, the agency is
eviscerated. This narrative was played out in the 1975 revisions to the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC).
In 1974, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
maintained that the government's interest in putting forward its position with
one voice outweighed the interest of the FTC in litigating its cases in a
manner tailored to meet its particular enforcement goals.3 12 In 1975,
309 Brief for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Windsor v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
310 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 786
(Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307).
" 2 U.S.C. § 687 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-4(b), 6384(a), 6384(c) (1988)
(Comptroller General); 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288c, 288d, 288f (1988) (Office of Senate Legal
Counsel). Although the President possesses limited appointment and removal power over the
Comptroller General, the Comptroller is typically thought to be an arm of Congress. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 747 (1986) (striking down the Gramm-Rudman Act on
separation of powers grounds because the Act gives an executive function to the Comptroller
General, who is subject to control by Congress); Bernard Schwartz, An Administrative Law
"Might Have Been" - Chief Justice Burger's Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42 ADMIN. L.
REv. 221, 232 (1990) ("[T]he key to Bowsher is that the Comptroller General is removable by
Congress, and therefore may not be entrusted with executive powers."' (quoting a letter from
Chief Justice Warren Burger to Justice John Paul Stevens (June 10, 1986))).
312 Devins, supra note 305, at 271; Elliott Karr, Independent Litigation Authority and
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Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. 313 The
Act granted independent litigating authority to the FTC. The purpose of the
change was a response to the perceived failure of the DOJ to adequately
represent the FTC.314
In addition to concerns about the adequacy of the FTC's representation
before the Court, a likely motivating factor behind Congress's decision to
transfer this authority to the FTC from the Solicitor General was a
combination of the desire to limit the power of the President and the DOJ
following Watergate and the "Saturday Night Massacre," 315 and the
overwhelming popularity of the FTC at the time during the "age of
consumerism" of the 1970s. 3 16 During this period, Congress considered
making the DOJ an independent agency.3 17
A similar storm seems to be brewing currently. Starting with President
George H.W. Bush's signing statements, the nature of Executive power has
been ever expanding. 318 The current Executive posture has created a real
tension with Congress, and Congress has been examining ways to restrict the
power.319 For the first time in a long time, Congress has appointed
Calls for the Views of the Solicitor General, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1080, 1084 (2009).
313 See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 204, 88 Stat. 2183, 2199 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1994))
(granting the FTC authority to represent itself before the Court); see also Act of Nov. 16, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591-92 (1973) (authorizing the FTC to represent itself
in lower federal courts).
314 Devins, supra note 305, at 269-77; Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences
ofDOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1345, 1348 (2000);
Karr, supra note 312, at 1085, 1091-93; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Guigon, 390 F.2d
323 (8th Cir. 1968).
315 See Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive In The Modem Era 1945-2004,
90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 665 (2005). In 1975, the year the FTC was granted independent litigation
authority, the Solicitor General was Robert Bork, who was involved in the dismissal of former
Solicitor General Archibald Cox. See generally Ruth Marcus & Al Kamen, Memories of the
'Saturday Night Massacre', WASH. PosT, July 2, 1987, at Al6.
316 Devins, supra note 305, at 272; Karr, supra note 312, at 1092-93. For background on
the 1974 Act, see Louis FISHER, THE PoLITIcs OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE 177-204 (3d ed. 1993).
31 S. 2803, 93d Cong. § 2(c) (1973). Under this proposal, the Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, and Solicitor General would serve six-year terms and would be removable
by the President only for "neglect of duty or malfeasance of office." Id.; see also Yoo, supra
note 315, at 663.
318 Developments in the Law - Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (2012)
(providing a historical description of the expansion of the signing statements); Amanda
Hollins-Brusky, Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political and Intellectual Investment in
the Unitary Executive Theory, 1981-2000, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 197, 236-38 (2011).
319 Charles, Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President Step Up a War?, 71 LA. L. REv. 391,
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independent counsel, BLAG, to ensure that the laws are enforced. Regardless
of the ultimate decision of the Court in the Windsor case regarding BLAG's
standing, Congress should take this as an opportunity to prevent the disparate
treatment of taxpayers in the future. 320 The method most closely tied to
historic precedent is that of the FTC.
There would be consequences to a shift of power in that manner. Most
importantly, the FTC model still grants only imperfect litigation authority.
The FTC may represent itself before the Court only in the event that the
Solicitor General declines to file a petition for certiorari. It would be
reasonable to assume that this secondary supervisory authority would create
tension between the FTC and the Solicitor General.
It appears, however, that the opposite result occurs. It has even been
argued that this independent litigation authority actually improves
"independent agency representation before the Supreme Court."321 In fact,
the Solicitor General has been a "respected advisor to the FTC on the
cert-worthiness of its claims and a more earnest representative of FTC
interests before the Court." 322
Moreover, by expanding the Service's authority, Congress could protect
its own interest in ensuring that the laws as written are enforced and all funds
are collected for the fisc. If the history of the Service demonstrates anything,
it is that the agency should not be beholden to either the executive or
legislative branch of government. 323 By granting independent litigation
authority to the agency, Congress might ensure that the goals of the 1998
Reform Act are protected.
Failure to act now, or compromising to a lesser authority, would result
in an Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)-like failure. In 1973,
Congress declined to grant the SEC independent litigating authority because
Erwin Griswold, Solicitor General, made a convincing case for the adequacy
of Solicitor General representation. 324 Then, in the early 1980s, the SEC
415 (2011).
320 In Windsor, the Court held that BLAG had standing. United States v. Windsor, 133
S.Ct. 2675, 2686-88 (2013).
321 Devins, supra note 305, at 307.
322 Id. at 307-08.
323 See supra Part II.B.
324 Devins, supra note 305, at 290; see also Securities Exchange Act Amendments of
1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. 343, 348-49, 355-57 (1978) (testimony and statement of
A. Everette MacIntyre, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission); id. at 282-84 (statement
of Solicitor General Erwin Griswold); A. Everette Maclntyre, The Status of Regulatory
Independence, 29 FED. B.J. 1, 8-9 (1968) (noting instances during the 1960s when the Solicitor
General refused the FTC's requests to file petitions for certiorari or refused to support an
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passed on a congressional invitation to revisit the independent litigating
authority issue.325 A proper balance seemed to be struck in which the
Solicitor General advocated the position the agency determined, but when
differences arose, the SEC position was either noted by the Solicitor General
or independently presented by the agency. 326
Unfortunately for the SEC, that utopia has not lasted. "From 1986 to
1993, the Solicitor General's office became more restrictive, paying less
attention to agency priorities in advancing the Solicitor General's vision of
the government's position."327 An example is the case Chicago Mercantile
Exchange v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 328 in which the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the SEC disagreed
with each other's interpretation of the applicable statute. The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the CFTC. The SEC wanted to appeal the case to the Court but
the Solicitor General agreed with the CFTC and refused. In the petition, the
Solicitor General refused to allow the SEC to file a separate brief, instead
summarizing and discrediting the SEC's views. 329
Much like it did with the SEC, Congress has contemplated giving the
Service independent agency status. A majority of the 1996 Commission
approved a host of recommendations with that tenor.330 One of the central
agency's position after allowing it to file in its own name).
325 Devins, supra note 305, at 290.
326 Id. at 290-91; see, e.g., Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 883 F.2d 537
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990); Brief for the Sec. Exch. Comm'n as Amicus
Curiae, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (No. 77-754).
327 Devins, supra note 305, at 292.
328 883 F.2d 537.
329 Devins, supra note 305, at 292; see Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at
20, American Stock Exch., Inc. v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 496 U.S. 936 (1990) (No. 89-1502)
("[P]etitioners and the SEC have cited the provision ... known as the 'SEC savings clause.'
That provision does not, in our view, justify limiting the CFTC's jurisdiction over [index
participations].").
330 NAT'L RESTRUCTURING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 118, at4, 6; Eric A. Lustig, IRS,
Inc. - The IRS Oversight Board - Effective Reform or Just Politics? Some Early Thoughts
from a Corporate Law Perspective, 42 DuQ. L. REv. 725, 733 (2004). The Commission's other
sixteen members were as follows: Democratic Congressman William J. Coyne (replaced in
January 1997 by Congressman Robert T. Matsui); Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr., Chairman
California State Board of Equalization; Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., (a former Service
Commissioner), law firm of Skadden, Arps et al.; Republican Senator Charles E. Grassley;
Gerry Harkins, Southern Pan Services Co.; Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary
(Communications and Information), U.S. Department of Commerce; David Keating, National
Taxpayers Union; Edward S. Knight, General Counsel, Treasury; J. Fred Kubik, Baird, Kurtz
& Dobson; Mark McConaghy, PricewaterhouseCoopers; George Newstrom, Electronic Data
Systems; Grover Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform; Robert Tobias, President, National
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recommendations was that "Congress should create an independent Board of
Directors to oversee the [Service] within the Treasury." 331 The Treasury had
a limited role in the oversight of Service policy and major problems because
of the abuses in the 1960s and 1970s by Nixon that lead to the 1976 Act by
Congress. Moreover, to the extent that Treasury acted, the guidance was
limited and chaotic.332 It has never been proposed that an FTC type structure
be adopted.
C. Delegating Authority to the DOJ
Although granting the Service ultimate litigation authority may be the
best construct for agency efficiency, the Service historically has not been able
to handle unchecked power. Thus, the pendulum swings back toward
granting exclusive authority for tax matters to the DOJ. The DOJ, ultimately,
is in the best position to litigate all matters. The DOJ, as the nation's law
firm, clearly has the capabilities to handle and understand the litigation
matters as well as manage the litigation. Moreover, having the DOJ conduct
secondary reviews of the Service positions achieves a better level of fairness
for taxpayers. 333
Despite the inherit tensions, the DOJ and not the agencies should be
positioned to apply a fair interpretation of the law without inherit bias in
agencies. Agencies have agendas and goals associated with the
administration of principles that are at times misguided. In the past, this has
been true of the Service's approach to enforcement. 334
Further, the prospect of the DOJ domination of agency decision-making
does not seem to trouble Congress. Even in the realm of independent
agencies, only three have litigating authority before the Court. If Congress
truly intended agencies to be able to reach policy decisions at odds with the
Executive, the current arrangement is at best counterproductive. The Solicitor
General's loyalty is first owed to the President and Attorney General and then
to the affected agencies. 335
Unfortunately, the DOJ is not immune from a misguided agenda. For
example, the DOJ will execute the prosecutorial discretion and policy-
making functions of the agency and decline to pursue winnable cases, it will
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331 Lustig, supra note 330, at 733.
332 NAT'L RESTRUCTURING COMM. REPORT, supra note 118, at 12.
3 See generally Peterson, supra note 55.
3 See generally supra text accompanying Part 111.
33 Devins, supra note 305, at 323.
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make litigating errors, and it will disrupt agency decision-making in ways
that will predictably weaken and dilute agency initiatives. 336 Nonetheless, the
DOJ is a better answer because its record of misguided agendas is far cleaner
than that of the agencies.337
There are problems with the pressures the Solicitor General faces from
the Executive. For example, the Solicitor General took a strange position in
Bob Jones University.338 Bob Jones concerned the Service's longstanding
practice of denying tax breaks to racially discriminatory private schools.
During the Reagan Administration, it was thought that Treasury was
persuaded by the Attorney General to reverse the Service position.339
Obviously, changing Service policy to permit tax-breaks for racially
discriminatory schools was a public policy nightmare. Therefore, the
President felt compelled to tell the nation that he was not a racist and the DOJ
litigated the Bob Jones case. The problem, like that of the DOMA cases, was
a lack of policy change within the Service. The executive made a decision to
no longer defend a position it was requiring the agency to continue to defend.
In that instance, the Solicitor General asked the Court to appoint "counsel
adversary" to Bob Jones University to defend the Service's earlier
position.340
The primary problem with the grant to the DOJ is dilution of the
Service's authority. By granting the authority to litigate in all matters, the
DOJ inevitably will interfere rather than advance substantive agency
programs, primarily, though not exclusively, by diluting effective
enforcement. 341 This is the reason that granting the DOJ authority is second
best. It is still, however, an improvement over the current situation.
336 Herz & Devins, supra note 314, at 1359.
33 There are tangential reports of misguided DOJ agendas. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts,
Defining "Partisan" Law Enforcement, 18 STAN. L. &POL'YREV. 324,325 (2007) (discussing
Republican-influenced DOJ misapplying the preclearance Voting Rights Act); Ellen S.
Podgor, Department ofJustice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice", 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167 (2004); Daniel P. Tokaji, IfIt's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights
Act Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 785 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the
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65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996) (discussing the Reno-rule governing prosecutorial ethics).
338 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1983).
3 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 623 n.9; Devins, supra note 305, at 276; Stuart Taylor,
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340 See Thomas McCoy & Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax
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As an executive agency, the Service has not always had the same powers
and responsibilities as it does in its current incarnation. 342 The agency
evolved from a mere tax collection agency to the point it possessed so much
discretion and unchecked power that Congress was compelled to create
restraints.343 The reform proposed during the Clinton administration was in
response to an outcry by taxpayers against the unreasonable tactics used by
the Service in seeking to enforce the tax code.344 The inquisitional nature of
tax administration unfortunately still is too familiar to taxpayers despite the
purpose of the 1998 Reform Act to create a more customer friendly service
provider.345
Despite the best intentions of Congress - including changing the burden
of proof,346 imposing civil damages for the Service agent's action,347 and
structural changes to the organizational framework 348 - the 1998 Reform
Act did not go far enough. Although the purpose and design of the reform
effort was to provide a supervisory check on the agency, the decision of
Congress to continue with the Service structure at the time was suboptimal.
The reform ultimately failed because it did not separate the Service's
investigatory responsibility from the enforcement responsibilities. There is
not much evidence that the 1998 Reform Act changed the Service's
behavior.349 The Service is still the police, the district attorney, and
sometimes even the judge. 350
The Bob Jones case provides evidence that a DOMA-like situation is not
342 See generally supra text accompanying Part III.
343 1998 Reform Act, supra note 11.
34 See 1998 Senate Hearing, supra note 11; 1997 Senate Hearing, supra note 11; see
generally Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 20-26; Gardner & Norman, supra note 11,
at 1357-61; Oei, supra note 11, at 1105-06.
34s See generally Camp, Administration, supra note 11, at 20-26.
346 See I.R.C. § 7491; see also Herzig, supra note 6, at 1084-85. See generally Camp,
Administration, supra note 11, at 20-26; Gardner & Norman, supra note 11, at 1361.
347 See I.R.C. § 7426(h)(1).
348 See 1998 Reform Act, supra note 11.
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Sex by Using Threat of Tax Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2013), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/01/vincent-burroughs-sex-irs-agent-n_2602505.html; IRS
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350 See Arno Herzberg, Blueprint of a Fair Tax Administration, 41 TAXES 161, 163
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isolated. Because of the perception of abuse by the Service, the current
structure encourages under-reporting by taxpayers, who view the system as
adversarial. In fact, the self-reporting system is designed on an
adversarial system. The taxpayer takes reporting positions that will not be
penalized if they meet certain litigation standards. The Service
process through audit and appeals is based on sustainable litigation positions.
So the question then beckons, why is the Service both establishing the
foundation for the litigation and litigating? The answer is that it should not
be doing both. That circumstance leaves but one option: removing the
litigation authority and vesting it exclusively in the DOJ.
